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GIVING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: REVISITING
THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE PASSING OFF IN
TRADEMARK LAW
John T. Cross*
Abstract- During the past twenty years, courts have increasingly come to accept a cause of
action for "reverse passing off." Unlike the more typical case of passing off, reverse passing
off occurs when a defendant sells a product manufactured by a plaintiff under the defendant's
own mark. Despite this difference, courts regularly invoke federal and state trademark laws,
including the Lanham Act, to give the plaintiff a right to recover. This Article challenges that
conclusion. It argues that the Lanham Act does not actually support a cause of action against a
defendant who engages in reverse passing off. In addition, most producers should not have a
right to insist that they be acknowledged as the source of a product. The only exception to this
conclusion is for artists, who, for several reasons, warrant this sort of protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
A few years ago the world of popular music was rocked when the
members of the band "Milli Vanilli" admitted that they had not actually
performed the songs on the group's hit album.' Car owners in the late
1970s were similarly irate when they learned that General Motors had
been installing Chevrolet engines in supposedly more upscale
Oldsmobile automobiles.2 Courts have been asked to determine whether
NBC "stole" the idea for "The Cosby Show,"3 and whether Steven
Spielberg properly acknowledged the person who came up with the plot
for the movie "ET."4 Although the individual cases are not as well-
publicized, charges of plagiarism have destroyed the reputations, and in
some cases even the careers, of many promising scholars and students.5
Professor of Law, University of Louisville. J.D., University of Illinois.
1. This uproar even spawned litigation. See Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225
(E.D. Pa. 1991), where buyers of the ill-fated album brought suit against the marketer of the
recording.
2. See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981); In re General Motors Corp.
Engine Interchange Litig. (Oswald v. General Motors Corp.), 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979); State
ex rel. Guste v. General Motors Corp., 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1978); Gour v. Darary Motor Co., 373
So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Amato v. General Motors Corp., 463 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982); see also Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760 (Il1. 1986).
3. Murray v. NBC, Inc., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988).
4. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984).
5. See, e.g., Albright v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 94-1320, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 961 (4th
Cir. Jan. 18, 1995); Yu v. Peterson, 13 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1993); McMillan v. Hunt, No.
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A common theme runs through all of these situations. In each,
someone receives credit for something produced by another.6 This false
credit offends our basic sense of fairness, regardless of whether it occurs
in the ivory towers of academics or the more rough-and-tumble world of
the automobile sales lot. It is therefore not surprising that the law has
intervened to deal with the problem of those who claim credit for the
work of others. The legal claim takes one of many forms, depending on
the situation. Most academic institutions view plagiarism as grounds for
censure or dismissal. A consumer who buys a Milli Vanilli album or an
Oldsmobile with a Chevrolet engine can sue for misrepresentation.7 Even
the Federal Trade Commission has stepped into the fray, using its powers
to supervise the market to prohibit sellers from taking false credit.'
The person with the greatest incentive to prevent a seller from taking
false credit is the person who actually produced the product. At present,
the law clearly affords this producer a remedy, the cause of action for
"reverse passing off."9 Many cases have allowed a party who actually
designed or produced a product to recover against a competitor who,
while falsely claiming to be the source, either resells that product or
91-3843, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17475 (6th Cir. July 21, 1992); Hand v. Matchett, 957 F.2d 791
(10th Cir. 1992); Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955 (1st Cir. 1991); Easley v. University of Mich.
Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1988); Agarwal v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d
504 (8th Cir. 1986); Hill v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1976); Tully v. Orr, 608
F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Abdelsayed v. Narumanchi, 668 A.2d 378 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert.
denied, 676 A.2d 397 (Conn. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 80 (1996); Woodruff v. Georgia State
Univ., 304 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1983); In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549 (I11. 1982): In re Zbiegien, 433
N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1988); Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982); In re Harper, 645 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Klinge v. Ithaca College,
634 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Kalinsky v. State Univ., 624 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995); Gilbert v. Wright State Univ., No. 12358, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2990 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 19, 1991); Faulkner v. University of Tenn., No. 01-A-01-9405-CH-00237, 1994 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1994); Heyligerv. State Univ. & Community College Sys., No.
01-A-01-9402-CH-0058, 1994 Tenn App. LEXIS 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27. 1994); Goodman v.
Gallerano, 695 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App. 1985).
6. In the Oldsmobile case, of course, the parent company General Motors dic. produce the engine.
However, the Oldsmobile Division was taking credit for engines actually produzed by the Chevrolet
Division. See In re General Motors, 594 F.2d at 1113; Gour, 373 So.2d at 573.
7. See cases cited supra notes 1-2.
8. United States v. American Greetings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1958), aftd, 272 F.2d
945 (6th Cir. 1959).
9. The phrase "reverse passing off' comes from the concept of "passing off," which has long been
recognized as actionable under the law of unfair competition. The terms "palming off" and "passing
off' are synonymous. A party engages in passing off when it sells its own goods using someone
else's name or mark. "Reverse" passing off, by contrast, occurs when a party sells goods that
originate from someone else under circumstances that suggest that the selling party is itself the
source.
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markets a similar product."0 These courts generally find a cause of action
in the common law of unfair competition, state unfair competition
statutes, or section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." Like regular passing off,
the customer deception caused by reverse passing off arguably fits within
the spirit, if not the letter, of all of these laws. Accordingly, the vast
majority of courts and commentators have concluded that reverse passing
off is actionable.
This Article reevaluates the doctrine of reverse passing off. Rejecting
the prevailing view, it argues that reverse passing off should not
ordinarily be actionable by competitors."2 Although the practice may
seem unfair at first glance, a closer analysis of reverse passing off shows
that it really does not harm either competitors or consumers in the same
ways as regular passing off or other deceptive practices. Absent such
harm, giving the source a right to recover either damages or specific
relief is little more than a windfall.
Part I of the Article traces the evolution of the cause of action for
reverse passing off. It also analyzes the elements that courts consider in
deciding these cases. In the process of exploring these elements, Part I
10. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994)
(defendant sold seeds that had been developed from plaintiff's genetic sources); Kasco Corp. v.
General Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1995) (defendant, in servicing plaintiffs meat
choppers, allegedly replaced knives with reconditioned knives manufactured by plaintiff); Classic
Font Corp. v. Fonthank, Inc., No. 94 C 607, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 1994)
(plaintiff licensed typeface to defendant, but defendant sold it as its own); Playboy Enters. v. Frena,
839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (defendant used plaintiff's photographs on its computer
billboard); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1890 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (defendant produced similar item, but used photograph of plaintiff's product
in its marketing materials); Childress v. Taylor, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(plaintiff wrote play based on idea of defendant's; plaintiff sued when defendant later starred in
similar play); Singh v. Xytel Corp., I U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741 (N.D. Il. 1986) (defendant marketed
software designed and written by plaintiff); By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp.
530 (D. Utah 1983) (defendant sold plaintiff's soft drinks in refillable bottles marked with
defendant's name); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Penn. 1976),
(defendant sold reproduction penny banks similar to those sold by plaintiff), modified on other
grounds, 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978). Numerous other cases are cited throughout this Article.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946. Although the original
version contained § 43(a), that provision was much more limited than the current form. Congress has
broadened the scope of§ 43(a) by several amendments, most notably in 1988. The effect of the 1988
amendments on Reverse Passing Off is discussed inf a at text accompanying notes 119-27.
12. The gist of this Article is that reverse passing off actually does not harm the market.
Therefore, the private right given to competitors is unnecessary. However, not all legal rules that
deal with reverse passing off are designed with the market in mind. Plagiarism codes, for example,
exist because the academy considers false claims of authorship to be morally wrong, not because it
affects the "market" for scholarship. This Article's criticism of the private cause of action does not
apply to laws that prohibit reverse passing off for non-economic reasons. Indeed, the author filly
agrees that reverse passing off is immoral.
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establishes a basic analytical framework for classifying the various types
of reverse passing off cases.
Part II deals with the question of whether any of the various bodies of
law cited as a basis for the cause of action for reverse passing off actually
covers the situation. Most cases invoke section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.' 3 A careful review of that section, however, reveals that it does not
actually reach reverse passing off. Therefore, the only possible source for
a general cause of action is state law. Although Part II recognizes that
some state laws may be preempted by federal copyright and patent laws,
it concludes that states are generally free to regulate reverse passing off.
Given that states can regulate the practice, Part III addresses the more
fundamental question of whether the law should impose liability for
reverse passing off. To answer this question, Part I carefully considers
the policy goals that the cause of action is meant to further. This analysis
shows that the cause of action really does not accomplish these goals.
First, contrary to the popular notion that a cause of action reduces market
deception, reverse passing off cannot actually result in any meaningful
consumer deception. Second, although the cause of action certainly
provides an additional benefit to the source of the product, that benefit is
unnecessary to stimulate innovation. Therefore, Section A of Part III
argues that legislatures should refrain from creating a general cause of
action for reverse passing off.
Section B considers whether that same conclusion should obtain when
the plaintiff is an artist, author, or composer. The law often treats
producers of art and literature differently than other sellers. These
different policy concerns, coupled with the United States' existing
obligations under the Berne Convention, 4 support granting artists and
authors a very limited cause of action for reverse passing off. Part III
concludes that a limited cause of action should be available to artists, and
offers a proposal of how this right could be put into law.
Before embarking on the analysis, it may be helpful to establish a
uniform terminology. 5 This Article will use the term plaintiff to refer to
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See cases cited infra note 98.
14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised
in Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
15. The cases and commentary employ a clumsy, inconsistent terminology. Perhaps because of
this, some courts have confused reverse passing off with other forms of unfair competition. In
Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995), for example, the court erroneously
labeled what was actually a privacy or right of publicity claim as one of reverse passing off. Id at
1051. Similarly, U-Haul, Int'l v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982), although commonly
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a party who has played a major role in producing or designing a product.
The defendant is the party who advertises or sells the product to the
public. Reverse passing off occurs when the defendant sells the product
under its own name, without acknowledging the role of the plaintiff.
Finally, this Article will use the capitalized phrase Reverse Passing Off
in lieu of the cumbersome phrase "cause of action for reverse passing
off."
It should be noted that the above definition of reverse passing off is
much broader than that used in some other discussions. It includes not
only the classic case in which the defendant resells a product that was
manufactured by the plaintiff,6 but also situations in which the defendant
sells its own copy of the original 7 and hybrid cases involving elements
of both resale and copying. 8 Further, a defendant engages in reverse
cited in discussions of reverse passing ofI is not itself a reverse passing off case. U-Haul actually
involves false comparative advertising.
16. See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994); Summit Mach. Tool Corp. v.
Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1993); Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp.,
906 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1990); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990); Williams v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1982); Alexander Binzel Corp. v. Nu-Tecsys Corp., 785
F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Il. 1992); Grambs v. Image Bank, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 7291, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6505 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1991); Feerick v. Arthur Young & Co., 715 F. Supp. 1234
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
For a variation on this theme, see Commodore Import Corp. v. Hiraoka & Co., 422 F. Supp. 628
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In this case, plaintiff had originally ordered the goods from a third party, but had
refused delivery. Defendant purchased and resold the same goods after attempting to eradicate the
plaintiff's trademark. The court in Commodore Import refused to hold defendant liable. 1d. at 632.
17. Most reverse passing off cases involve copying instead of resale. See, e.g., EFS Mktg., Inc. v.
Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 1996); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc.,
35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994); Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., 14 F.3d 596, 1993 WL 509876 (4th Cir.
Dec. 8, 1993); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990); Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921
F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Blank v. Pollack, 916 F. Supp. 165 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Florentine Art
Studio, Inc. v. Vedet K. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 532 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Woodke v. Dahm, 873 F. Supp.
179 (N.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 70 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1996); Offbeat, Inc. v. Cager, No. 94-2796, 1995
WL 214479 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 1995); CD Law Inc. v. LawWorks Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352
(W.D. Wash. 1994); FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Beacham v. MacMillan, Inc., 837
F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Debs v. Meliopoulus, No. 1:90-cv-939-WCO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19864 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 1991). Other examples are cited throughout this Article.
Not all authors consider copying cases as true reverse passing off cases. One influential article, for
example, entirely omits copying cases from its analysis of reverse passing off. See William M.
Borchard, Reverse Passing Off-Commercial Robbery or Permissible Competition?, 67 Trademark
Rep. 1 (1977). However, because courts use the label "reverse passing olf' for both copying and
resale cases, this Article will include both. Nevertheless, Part ILI.B of this Article ultimately draws a
distinction between the two categories.
18. See, e.g., Cleary, 30 F.3d 1255.
There is also an entire subcategory of what can be dubbed "sample" cases, in which the defendant
sells a product similar to plaintiff's, but uses either plaintiff's product or a photo of that product as a
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passing off in any situation where its actions cause consumers to believe
that the product originates from the defendant, regardless of whether the
defendant makes an express statement to that effect.' 9 Because all of the
cases revolve around the essential issue of whether the plaintiff is
sample in its sale. See, e.g., Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.
1982); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1982); Vibrant
Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981); Bangor Punta Operations,
Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1976); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); Additive Control & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata Inc.,
29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1890 (S.D. Tex. 1993); CCS Communication Control, Inc. v. Law
Enforcement Assocs., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); John Wright, :nc. v. Casper Corp.,
419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified on other grounds, 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978);
Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. Solar Sound Sys., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); American
Precast Corp. v. Maurice Concrete Prods., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 859 (D. Mass.), af'd, 502 F.2d 1159
(Ist Cir. 1973); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); George O'Day
Assocs., Inc. v. Talman Corp., 206 F. Supp. 297 (D.RI.), af'd, 310 F.2d 621; (1st Cir. 1962). Of
course, defendant has removed any reference to plaintiff from the sample, for otherwise the case
would be an ordinary trademark infringement case. In addition, defendant's product is sufficiently
similar to plaintiff's to forestall a claim that use of the photo or sample is false, advertising. But cf
L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (recognizing false
advertising claim where products are different).
The sample cases could be treated as a third category. However, the analysis used in this Article
would ultimately treat the sample cases exactly the same as the copying cases After all, any harm
that plaintiff suffers is attributable to the purchase of defendant's similar product, not from the use of
the sample. See infra note 69.
19. Several courts and commentators distinguish between "express" and "implied" reverse
passing off. Cleary, 30 F.3d at 1261; Summit Mach., 7 F.3d at 1443; Woodke, 873 F. Supp. at 190;
CD Law, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1357; Debs, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864, at *20 n.8; Xerox Corp. v.
Apple Computer, USA, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1551-52 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Rosenfeld v. W.B.
Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236, 241 (S.D.N.Y.), afJrd, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990); PIC Design Corp. v.
Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Borchard, supra note 17, at 2;
Lori H. Freedman, Reverse Passing Off. A Great Deal of Confusion, 83 Trademark Rep. 305, 305
(1993); Leon H. Rittenberg Ill, Roho, Inc. v. Marquis: A Conservative Interpretation of Reverse
Palming Off, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1755, 1759 (1991); Randolph Stuart Sergent, Bvilding Reputational
Capital: The Right ofAttribution Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts
45, 50-51 (1995). In a case of express reverse passing off, the defendant makes a positive claim to
be the source of the product Implied reverse passing off, by contrast, occurs when the defendant
removes all reference to the plaintiff from the product, but does not add its own name or mark.
The line between express and implied reverse passing off is not always clear. For example, while
both Borchard and Freedman argue that defendant's use of its own mark constitutes an express claim
of source, the Southern District of New York disagrees. Banff, 921 F. Supp. 1065; see also
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 5 cmt. b (1995) (arguing that def.-ndant's substitution
of its mark is ordinarily not enough to deceive consumers as to source of product). For a discussion
of whether use of a false copyright or patent notice constitutes a false representation, see infra notes
81-82.
This Article rejects any bright-line distinction between express and implied reverse passing off. As
discussed infra note 85, a more useful distinction is between cases of misattribution and non-
attribution.
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entitled to receive credit, it is useful to consider all of them in a general
discussion of reverse passing off.
II. THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING REVERSE PASSING OFF
Most of the cases that use the phrase "reverse passing off" were
decided during the last fifteen years.2" Nevertheless, although the label is
of a fairly recent vintage, courts have been wrestling with reverse passing
off cases throughout this century. This section briefly reviews the
development of the law governing reverse passing off. Following that, it
analyzes the elements of the action and provides a conceptual framework
for classifying the various types of reverse passing off cases. This
framework will prove useful later in the analysis.
A. Evolution of the Doctrine
Courts throughout this century have indicated that there is something
wrong with failing to acknowledge the source of a commercial product.
The U.S. Supreme Court said as much in International News Service2
(INS), a decision that has had a major impact on intellectual property
law. In INS, the defendant had copied the content of news that had been
collected and originally published by a rival news organization.'
Although the majority opinion focused on the appropriation of the news
itself, it also indicated that the defendant had made an actionable "false
representation" when it published the copied news under its own name.'
Justice Holmes elaborated upon the theme of deceit in his concurrence,
arguing that although the defendant should be free to copy the news, it
was required to inform readers that the original publisher was the source
of that news. To Holmes, the defendant's act involved the same basic
"evil" as a normal passing off case.24
20. See infra note 33 for a discussion of the phenomenal recent growth of the doctrine.
21. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
22. Id at231.
23. Id. at 242. For an even earlier discussion of the idea that false claims of origin constitute an
actionable false representation, see the concurring opinion of Justice Seabury in Clemens v. Press
Publishing Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206,207-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910).
24. INS, 248 U.S. at 247-48 (Holmes, J., concurring).
The argument that reverse passing off involves the same basic wrong as ordinary passing off
survives to this day. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226,
1241 (8th Cir. 1994); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Montoro,
648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981); Rittenberg, supra note 19, at 1758.
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A case more directly on point is the Seventh Circuit's 1929 decision,
Federal Electric Co. v. Flexlume Corp.' This case involved a defendant
who serviced signs that had been manufactured by the plaintiff. When
servicing a sign, the defendant would replace the plaintiff's mark with
defendant's own, thereby suggesting to passers-by that it had
manufactured the sign.26 The court held that defendant's false
representation constituted common law unfair competition.
27
Over the next fifty years, several courts upheld claims of Reverse
Passing Off.28 Others disagreed, however, finding that a failure to
acknowledge was not actionable. 29 Reviewing the cases from the fifty
year period following Federal Electric, it is apparent that reverse passing
off had not yet gelled into a cohesive legal doctrine. Courts recognized
that some injury could result from a failure to acknowledge, but could
not agree on whether that harm was compensable under tort law.3"
Widespread acceptance of a cause of action began around 1980. In
retrospect, two factors were instrumental in giving life to the cause of
action. The first was a highly influential 1977 law review article in which
William M. Borchard reviewed and categorized the case law as it stood
at the time. Borchard's analysis, especially his discussion of the harm
25. 33 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1929).
26. Id. at 414.
27. Id. at 414-15.
28. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.
1976); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified on other
grounds, 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); FRA S.p.A. v. Surg-O-Flex of Am., lnc., 415 F. Supp. 421
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Middletown Mfg. Co. v. Super Sagless Corp., 382 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Miss. 1974),
afJd, 515 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1975); American Precast Corp. v. Maurice Concrete Prods., Inc., 360
F. Supp. 859 (D. Mass.), afld, 502 F.2d 1159 (lst Cir. 1973); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261
F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); National Dynamics Corp. v. John Surrey, Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); cf Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976)
(although court treats as reverse passing off case and allows plaintiff to recover, it is not entirely
clear that defendant's use of photo was actually reverse passing off); C.M. Pe.ula Co. v. Logan, 355
F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (although court dismisses copyright claim, it orders defendant, who
had incorporated plaintiff's photos into its own product, to acknowledge plaintiff as source of
photos).
29. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1947); L&L White Metal Casting
Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Pezon et Michr.l v. Ernest R. Hewin
Assoc., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 423, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); George O'Day Assocs., Inc. v. Talman
Corp., 206 F. Supp. 297, 299-300 (D.RLI.), afd, 310 F.2d 623 (Ist Cir. 1962); Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 228 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
30. See the extensive discussion in Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), in which the court, although expressing doubt about whether a cause of action
exists, chose to dispose of the case on the ground that plaintiff failed to demonstrate customer
confusion.
31. See Borchard, supra note 17.
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that could result from a failure to give credit, continues to influence the
courts to this day.s
2
The second factor was the Ninth Circuit's 1981 opinion in Smith v.
Montoro.3 In Smith, an actor who had performed in a film sued when the
distributor removed the actor's name from the film credits and
advertising material, and substituted the name of another actor.3 4 The
aggrieved actor brought several different claims. The Ninth Circuit's
opinion, however, dealt only with plaintiff's claim under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.35 The court held that the substitution constituted a "false
designation or representation" within the meaning of section 43(a), and
that the plaintiff could therefore use that federal law to recover.36
Although Smith was not the first case to recognize a cause of action
for reverse passing off, the court's in-depth analysis proved quite
influential. At last count, Reverse Passing Off is recognized by the
Second,37 Third, 3  Fifth,39 Seventh,40 Eighth,41 Ninth,42 and probably the
Eleventh43 circuits. In addition, at least one trial court in the Fourth,'
32. Witco Chem. Corp. v. United States, 742 F.2d 615, 625 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. 648 F.2d 602. Smith has been cited extensively in later cases. Its influence can perhaps be
suggested by the fact that a LEXIS search revealed only six pre-Smith cases using the phrases
"reverse passing off' or "reverse palming off." In the 16 years since Smith, no fewer than 85 cases
have used one or both of these phrases.
34. Id. at 603.
35. Id. The trial court had dismissed that claim. Because that court had only ancillary jurisdiction
over the state law claims, the trial court had dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction at the
same time it dismissed the Lanham Act claim. Id.
36. Id at 605-07. Smith's interpretation of § 43(a) is noteworthy for another reason. The court
also held that the actor had standing to bring a § 43(a) claim notwithstanding the lack of any direct
competition between him and the distributor. Id, at 607-08.
37. See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, 43 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1994); Arrow United
Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678 F.2d 410,415 (2d Cir. 1982).
38. See, e.g., Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982).
39. See, e.g., Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990); Bangor Punta Operations,
Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976).
40. See, e.g., Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1990);
F.E.L. Publications Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 416 (7th Cir.
1981); see also discussion supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
41. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1241 (8th Cir.
1994).
42. In addition to Smith, see Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 1994) and
Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406-08 (9th Cir. 1988).
43. The Eleventh Circuit has not itself faced the issue. However, the Eleventh Circuit was carved
out of the Fifth in 1981. Precedent from the Fifth Circuit rendered prior to the split applies in the
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Tenth,45 and, most recently, the First& Circuits have recognized Reverse
Passing Off in certain circumstances. Many of these cases cite Smith as
authority. The Sixth,47 District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits have
not yet faced the issue.
Eleventh. As the Fifth Circuit had accepted reverse passing off by 1976, see supra note 39, the
doctrine should also be valid in the Eleventh Circuit.
Trial court opinions from the new Eleventh Circuit bear this out. See Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839
F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff); Marling v. Ellison, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (allowing recovery); see also Debs v. Meliopoulus, No. 1:90-
ev-939-WCO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 1991) (although recognizing cause
of action, holding that defendant prevailed because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate both that it
was creator of class notes in question and that readers would be confused by failure to acknowledge
plaintiff as source).
44. See, e.g., Hospital for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67, 73 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (holding that defendant's use of title of play "Peter Pan," to which p laintiff held copyright
for musical, constitutes reverse passing off).
Admittedly, the Fourth Circuit itself recently upheld the grant of a summatr judgment dismissing
a reverse passing off claim in its unpublished opinion in Takeall v. Pepsico, hic., 14 F.3d 596, 1993
Wi. 509876, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993). However, the plaintiff in Takeall had based its reverse
passing off claims only on state law. The court found that these state law claims were preempted by
the federal copyright laws. Id at *6. Most plaintiffs in reverse passing off eases rely on a federal law,
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994), as the basis for at least one of their claims.
The copyright laws, of course, would not preempt a Lanham Act claim.
Takeall is nevertheless relevant for its discussion of copyright preemption, an issue discussed in
greater depth infra notes 146-70.
45. By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D. Utah 1983) (allowing
recovery, citing Ninth Circuit precedent).
46. Kasco Corp. v. General Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 29, 35 (D. Mass. 1995) (allowing claim
under Lanham Act where defendant failed to indicate plaintiffas source, although explicitly rejecting
labels "reverse passing off' and "reverse palming off" as not particularly helpfal).
The Kasco court's recent acceptance of Reverse Passing Off is particularly significant insofar as
the Massachusetts district court had previously refused to recognize the cause of action. General
Elec. Co. v. Iljin Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-40094-GN, 1993 WL 41752 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 1993);
Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. v. Poli, 783 F. Supp. 670 (D. Mass. 1991). The General Electric and
Boothroyd decisions were based on language in the influential 1949 case of Samson Crane, where
the district court interpreted recently-enacted § 43 of the Lanham Act as applying only to acts
"closely associated with the misuse of trademarks, i.e., the passing off of one's own goods as those
of a competitor." Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass.
1949), affd, 180 F.2d 896 (Ist Cir. 1950). Not only was Samson Crane itself affirmed by the First
Circuit, but its restrictive language was cited with approval in later First Circuit cases, most recently
in Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F.2d 478, 491 (Ist Cir, 1988), a case that did
not involve reverse passing off. The Kasco court nevertheless reasoned that this restrictive
interpretation was in error, especially in light of the 1988 amendments to § 43(a) and the indications
of Congressional intent behind those amendments. Kasco, 905 F. Supp. at 34. Whether Kasco's
acceptance of the cause of action accurately reflects the views of the First Circuit remains to be seen.
47. The Northern District of Ohio and Sixth Circuit were presented with a situation involving
reverse passing off in United States v. American Greetings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1958),
affd, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959). However, this was not a private cause of action; it was instead an
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Virtually all of the reverse passing off cases have been litigated in the
federal courts, with only a handful in the state courts.48 Illinois has
recognized that reverse passing off may be actionable under the law of
misappropriation.49 California apparently allows a similar claim under a
theory of fraud or misrepresentation." New York, by contrast, held in
1962 that reverse passing off did not qualify as unfair competition."
However, given the vintage of the decision and the substantial
development of the cause of action over the past thirty years, the
continued vitality of this New York precedent is open to question.52
action brought by the Federal Trade Commission under § 5(1) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)
(1994).
The possibility of using federal agencies to police reverse passing off is discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 250-51.
48. As will be discussed infra at text accompanying notes 97-98, most plaintiffs include a claim
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and therefore easily qualify for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994). If the plaintiff also adds one or more state law claims, the federal
court may hear the entire case under the expansive language of § 1338(b).
Not all cases involve a Lanham Act claim. In many of these cases, however, the plaintiff will have
included a claim under the patent or copyright law. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.
1986) (copyright and state law defamation, unfair competition, and product disparagement); FASA
Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (copyright and state law
misappropriation); American Precast Corp. v. Maurice Concrete Prods., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 859
(D. Mass.) (patent and state law unfair competition), aft'd, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973). Section
1338(b) also allows jurisdiction over the state law claims in these cases.
49. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526, 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), affid, 456
N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). Because the court allowed recovery under state law, it found it unnecessary to
deal with plaintiff's Lanham Act claim. lit
50. Parsons v. Tickner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). In Parsons, the daughter
of a deceased composer sued the composer's former business partners after she learned that the
partners had taken control of the composer's music. Ra at 813. Although the daughter's complaint
relied primarily on the theory of conversion, she also asserted that the partners committed fraud or
misrepresentation when they alleged that the songs belonged to them. Idl The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's grant of a demurrer regarding plaintiff's entire case. However, the court
focused primarily on the issues of standing and the statute of limitations, and never directly
addressed the merits of the reverse passing off claim. Id at 815-20. Nevertheless, the fact that the
court overturned the demurrer in its entirety suggests that it recognizes a cause of action.
51. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 228 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515-16 (N.Y. App. Div.
1962).
The earlier case of Benelli v. Hopkins, 103 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), although dealing
with a case facially similar to reverse passing off, is not really on point. The defendant in Benelli had
been granted a license to produce plaintiff's play. Id. at 528. When plaintiff attempted to market a
newer version of the play, defendant threatened the potential licensees with legal action. Id Because
defendant was not taking credit for the newer version of the play, Beneli is not a reverse passing off
case.
52. The federal courts in New York are apparently convinced that an action lies under state law.
In Blank v. Pollack, 916 F. Supp. 165 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), the court denied a motion to dismiss
plaintiff's fraud and misappropriation claims under New York law. Id at 170.
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Courts have invoked Reverse Passing Off in a wide variety of
situations. Like the plaintiff in Smith v. Montoro,53 a number of authors
and artists have sued when a publisher or producer failed to acknowledge
their work. 4 Courts have applied the doctrine not just to film, but also to
books,55 songs,56 scripts,5 7 and other artistic works. Plaintiffs other than
artists have also sued for Reverse Passing Off when their commercial
products are resold with the original mark removed, incorporated into
new products, copied, or used as samples for the sale of competing
products.58 For some reason, a surprising number of cases involve the
copying of dolls.
53. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
54. Some of these cases resemble Smith, where an original work that an artist or author helped to
produce is attributed to someone else. See, e.g., Beacham v. MacMillan, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.
Ind. 1993) (publisher failed to include author's name on book); Feerick v. Arthur Young & Co., 715
F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (partner helped to create work for use of partnership; partnership
distributed work without acknowledging his role); Dodd v. Fort Smith Sp-.eial Sch. Dist., 666
F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (failure to acknowledge authorship of book). More commonly,
however, the author or artist complains that someone else has copied a work vithout disclosing the
original. See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to give credit for
author's work on prior edition of revised book); Kregos v. Associated Press. 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir.
1993) (plaintiff alleges copyright infringement and state law claims); Kregos v. Associated Press,
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (same; defendant put false copyright notice in its name on pitching form
created by plaintiff); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant produced
screenplay similar to plaintiff's); Offbeat, Inc. v. Cager, No. 94-2796, 1995 WL 214479 (E.D. La.
Apr. 11, 1995) (defendant copied plaintiff's mailing list); CD Law Inc. v. LawWorks Inc., 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (defendant copied plaintiff's computer software);
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (defendant copied plaintiff's pictures
onto computer bulletin board, adding its own name in process); Childress v. Taylor, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (play performed without acknowledging playwright as author);
Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (defendant produced series based on plaintiff's
story), affd on other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639
F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (defendant produced similar greeting cards), ajr'd, 833 F.2d 117 (8th
Cir. 1987); Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 702 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (dmfendant copied much
of plaintiff's work in cookbook). The distinction between a "resale" case like Smith and a case
involving copying will prove important to many issues in this analysis, and will therefore be
explored in greater depth infra at text accompanying notes 63-70.
55. Cleary, 30 F.3d 1255; Beacham, 837 F. Supp. 970; Dodd, 666 F. Sup;). 1278; Clark Equip.
Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., No. 82 C 4585, 1985 WL 2917 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1985); RtH. Donnelley
Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (telephone book).
56. See, e.g., Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9h Cir. 1988); F.E.L.
Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982).
57. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990); Murray v. NBC, Inc., 844 F.2d
988 (2d Cir. 1988); Nash, 704 F. Supp. 823.
58. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994)
(copying of hybrid seeds); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990) (parts incorporated
into new product); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1982) (resale of unused
and reconditioned parts under defendant's own mark); Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards,
Inc., 678 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1982) (use of plaintiff's damper as sample for selling defendant's
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Courts have allowed recovery in all of these situations. In fact, since
1980, Reverse Passing Off has been warmly embraced by courts across
the country. All of the federal courts that have actually considered the
question have ultimately come to the conclusion that at least some types
of reverse passing off are actionable.' A number of scholars have also
championed the cause of action.6'
B. The Elements ofReverse Passing Off
Courts not only agree that reverse passing off is actionable, but also
agree on the general elements of a successful claim. Although no court
states the elements this precisely, the following five-part test reflects a
typical analysis.
1. The Product Must Originate with the Plaintiff
The crux of reverse passing off is that defendant is taking credit for
someone else's work. Accordingly, there can be no Reverse Passing Off
claim if the product originates with the defendant or a third party.62
product); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1982) (use of
photograph of plaintiffs product to sell defendant's copy); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.
Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1976) (use of photograph of plaintiff's boat in
defendant's advertising); CyberOptics Corp. v. Yamaha Motor Co., No. 3-95-1174, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12614 (D. Minn. July 30, 1996) (resale of plaintiff's international laser system in domestic
market); Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 933 F. Supp. 918 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
By-Rite Dist., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530 (D. Utah 1983) (resale of soft drinks in
bottles with other party's mark); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Penn.
1976) (copying of coin banks), modified on other grounds, 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 228 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (resale of bongo
drums).
59. EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1646 (2d Cir. 1996); Kamar
Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,
630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see
also Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant
made dolls that represented plaintiff's fictional character"Paddington Bear").
60. See supra notes 37-46.
61. Borchard, supra note 17, at 23-24; Freedman, supra note 19, at 320-23; Rittenberg, supra
note 19, at 1765-66. For a related but more general consideration, see Edward J. Damich, The Right
of Personality: A Common Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 Ga. L.
Rev. 1 (1988).
Not all of the commentary supports the cause of action. For a criticism of the cases that allow
artists and authors to recover for non-attribution under § 43(a), see Sergent, supra note 19, at
69-77.
62. Jacobs v. Transocean Entertainment, No. 95-55804, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27591 (9th Cir.
Oct. 22, 1996) (finding plaintiff's contribution to end product insufficient to give right to claim to be
source); EFS Mktg., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1646 (refusing to hold that plaintiff is source of design because
Washington Law Review Vol. 72:709, 1997
The problem, of course, is determining where a given product actually
originates. Smith is an exceptionally easy case in this regard, for the
actor's performance could by definition only originate with him. Other
cases are much more difficult. In many ways the question of origin is one
of both physics and metaphysics. One basic concern underlying Reverse
Passing Off is that consumers are deceived if defendant falsely takes
credit for the product. That deception cannot exist if customers, knowing
all of the facts, would still consider defendant the origin. Therefore, a
court must determine origin from the perspective of the customer, not the
scientist or engineer.
In analyzing the first element of Reverse Passing Off, it is useful to
divide the Reverse Passing Off cases into two categon es, the "resale"
and "copying" cases. Each category raises fundamentally different
questions of origin. Accordingly, application of the first element may
well differ in each.
In a resale case, the plaintiff is responsible for the actual manufacture
of the product. Plaintiff may have built the product itself,63 or arranged
with a third party to build something to specification.' Smith and many
of the other cases involving artists and authors also fall into this
category, for in each the plaintiff was directly responsible for the final
product.
65
defendant's troll dolls similar to those produced by other sellers); Roho, 902 F.2d 356 (finding that
although defendant's product was made of parts produced by plaintiff, the product was new and
discrete); Murray, 844 F.2d 988 (holding that where plaintiff's work completely lacks originality,
plaintiffnot entitled to be named as source); Kamar, 657 F.2d 1059 (finding that plaintiffcannot win
absent proof that defendant either copied or resold plaintiff's product); Debs v. Meliopoulus, No.
1:90-cv-939-WCO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 1991) (finding that class notes
used by defendant were produced mainly by defendant, not plaintiff); Feerick v. Arthur Young &
Co., 715 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that book written mainly by defendant, not
plaintiff).
63. See, e.g., Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir.
1993) (although products produced in China, they were designed by plaintiff; plaintiff sought credit
in part for design); Web Printing Controls Co., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir.
1990); Roho, 902 F.2d 356; Williams, 691 F.2d 168; Federal Elec. Corp. v. Flexlume Corp., 33 F.2d
412 (7th Cir. 1929); Summit Tech., 933 F. Supp. 918; Kasco Corp. v. Gen. Servs. Inc., 905 F. Supp.
29 (D. Mass. 1995); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45 (N.D. Ga.
1984); By-Rite Distrib., 577 F. Supp. 530; Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 509 F. Supp. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
64. See, e.g., Alexander Binzel Corp. v. Nu-Tecsys Corp., 785 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
Commodore Import Corp. v. Hiraoka & Co., 422 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But cf Display
Producers, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding for defendant because
there was no evidence that defendant knew that third party producer would claim to be origin).
65. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Montoro, 648
F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981); Grambs v. Image Bank, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 7291, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Ascertaining the origin of a product is relatively easy in the resale
cases. If defendant acquires a product originally manufactured by
plaintiff and merely resells it as its own, it is clear that plaintiff is the
"origin," at least in the absolute sense of that word.' But difficult issues
can arise even here. In some of the cases, for example, the defendant
made significant changes to the product before reselling it as its own.67
Courts must weigh the input of each party in the final product in order to
determine who consumers would consider to be the source.
Although there are a good number of resale cases, most Reverse
Passing Off cases are copying cases. The defendant in a copying case
actually builds, or arranges to have built, its own product. However,
defendant's product is a close copy of something that was designed or
produced by the plaintiff. Of course, a defendant who copies a distinct
product may be liable for copyright, patent,6" or regular trademark
6505 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1991); Feerick, 715 F. Supp. 1234; C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp.
189 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
66. However, see infra text accompanying notes 190-200 for a discussion of how the meaning of
the word "origin" may differ depending upon the context. The dictionary meaning of that word,
although useful in a copyright or patent case, is not necessarily appropriate in a reverse passing off
case.
67. Roho, 902 F.2d at 357; Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678 F.2d 410, 412
(2d Cir. 1982); Alexander Binzel, 785 F. Supp. at 720; see also Summit Tech., 933 F. Supp. 918
(defendant imported and sold international versions of plaintiff's product, which differed from
domestic version).
68. Copying is the gist of a patent or copyright infringement claim. It should therefore not be
surprising that plaintiffs in copying-type Reverse Passing Off cases frequently add a claim under the
copyright or patent laws. See, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995) (copyright);
Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993) (copyright); Takeall v. Pepsico, 14 F.3d 596,
1993 WL 509876, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993) (copyright); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353
(9th Cir. 1990) (copyright); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (copyright); Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (copyright); F.E.L.
Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982)
(copyright); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1976)
(copyright); Campbell v. Osmond, 917 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (copyright); Banff Ltd. v.
Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (copyright); Offbeat, Inc. v. Cager, No. 94-2796,
1995 WL 214479 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 1995) (copyright); FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869
F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. i1. 1994) (copyright); Cognotec Servs. Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 862
F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (copyright); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata,
Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1890 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (patent); Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. v. Poli, 783
F. Supp. 670 (D. Mass. 1991) (copyright); Bull Publ'g Co. v. Sandoz Nutrition Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1678 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (copyright); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special Sch. Dist. No. 100, 666
F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (copyright); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 816
(W.D. Mont. 1986) (copyright), afj'd, 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987); American Precast Corp. v.
Maurice Concrete Prods., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 859 (D. Mass.) (patent), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1159 (Ist Cir.
1973). This same overlap, however, also raises the possibility that the Reverse Passing Off claim
may be preempted, an issue to be addressed infra at text accompanying notes 145-82.
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infringement.69 Reverse Passing Off is not a substitute for these claims,
but instead deals with a separate and discrete injury. The plaintiff who
sues for Reverse Passing Off is not directly challenging the defendant's
right to copy. Plaintiff is merely claiming that if defendant does copy, it
must tell consumers who actually designed the product. Because it deals
with a separate wrong, the success or failure of a Reverse Passing Off
claim does not turn on plaintiff's ability to recover for ordinary
infringement.
The question of origin is far more complex in a copying case. Even in
the simplest case, where defendant produces an exact duplicate of
plaintiffs product, the final product is the result of both plaintiffs and
defendant's labors. A court must determine if, from the consumer's
perspective, the origin of a particular product is the person who designs it
or the person who controls its actual manufacture. This may differ from
product to product, or even from consumer to consumer.
The issue is even more complex when defendant's copy is not exact.
Much of the discussion of the question of origin in the copying cases is
dedicated to the question of how similar the products must be. An
excellent example is the disagreement between the Second and Ninth
Circuits concerning the test to use for determining the "source" of a
literary work. The Second Circuit requires only that the works be
69. Courts have increasingly turned to the "trade dress" branch of trademark law to protect a
producer against someone who copies a unique product design. The Supreme Court greatly
facilitated the law of trade dress in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 50.5 U.S. 763 (1992), in
which the Court allowed a restaurant to protect its decorative motif. Since Two Pesos, other courts
have allowed trade dress to be protected. See, e.g., Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915
F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The question of trade dress and the related question of product
configuration have proven terribly difficult for courts and commentators, and are likely to dominate
the discussion of trademark law for some time to come.
However, that debate is of little relevance here, for there is a fundamental difierence between these
trade dress/product configuration cases and a case of reverse passing off. In the former, the design of
plaintiff's product serves, or is capable of serving, as an indication of source. If defendant markets a
product of similar design, consumers may conclude that defendant's product comes from plaintiff. In
a reverse passing off case, by contrast, the product design does not serve as an indication of source,
either because it is functional or because it is not perceived by consumers as an indication of source.
Absent any reference to plaintiff, purchasers assume that plaintiff's product comes from defendant or
a third party. In this sense, then, reverse passing off is truly the reverse of ordinary infringement.
Courts have sometimes confused the distinction between product configuration and reverse
passing off claims. See, e.g., Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.
1981). In Vibrant, defendant used a photograph of plaintiff's product in advertising its own product.
The court rejected plaintiff's § 43(a) claim, finding that none of the features of plaintiff's product
indicated source. In so doing, the court failed to recognize that this very finding made the dispute a
paradigmatic reverse passing off case.
724
Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off
"substantially similar."7 The Ninth Circuit, however, permits the
defendant to claim to be the source unless its work is a "bodily
appropriation" of plaintiff's work. This standard is satisfied only if the
works are virtually identical.7'
Both of these standards borrow heavily from the law of copyright. The
substantial similarity test is the test used to determine copyright
infringement.72 The bodily appropriation test, by contrast, incorporates
copyright's concept of originality. Under the law of copyright, a party is
treated as an author even if his work consists only of making a few
significant changes to an earlier work produced by another.73 If such
minor changes are enough to garner copyright protection, they should
perhaps be enough for a defendant in a Reverse Passing Off case to make
an honest claim to be the origin.
Each test has its advantages and disadvantages.7 4 However, as will be
discussed below, borrowing from principles of copyright and patent law
70. The Second Circuit's most recent applications of this standard are Waldman Publishing
Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775,783 (2d Cir. 1994), and Kregos, 3 F.3d at 663.
Other courts agree with the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Campbell, 917 F. Supp. at 1582-83; Debs v.
Meliopoulus, No. 1:90-cv-939-WCO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864, at *39-40 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18,
1991).
71. During the 1980s, the Ninth Circuit twice considered, but refused to decide, whether it would
follow the Second Circuit's "substantial similarity" test or the stricter "bodily appropriation" test.
Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358; Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir.
1981). The court finally opted for the bodily appropriation standard in 1990 in Shaw, 919 F.2d at
1364-65. The Shaw court construed its earlier precedent in Smith, 648 F.2d 602, and Lamothe, 847
F.2d 1403, as limiting Reverse Passing Off to cases where defendant takes credit for a product
physically produced by the plaintiff. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1364. Because the defendant in Shaw had not
engaged in such bodily appropriation, the court refused to recognize a Reverse Passing Off claim. Id.
Shaw is ambiguous about whether a party can ever assert a Reverse Passing Off claim under the
Lanham Act in a copying case involving a work of art or literature. In the penultimate sentence of
the opinion, for example, the court states flatly, "We decline to expand the Lanham Act to cover
cases in which the Federal Copyright Act provides an adequate remedy." Id. at 1364-65. However,
the court soon cleared up any misunderstanding on that note in Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255
(9th Cir. 1994). Cleary expressly recognizes that a cause of action can exist, and provides a precise
definition of bodily appropriation. A defendant appropriates a plaintiff's work when it copies it
without making any significant variations. Id. at 1261. Whether a variation is significant is measured
by whether consumers of the copy would confuse it for the original.
72. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966). For a general analysis
and criticism of the standard, see Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decsionmaking: The
Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 719 (1987).
73. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-51 (1991); Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
74. The bodily appropriation standard has a greater logical appeal. The problem with the
substantial similarity test is that it assumes that copyright law alone defines the relative rights of
plaintiff and defendant. However, the issue in a reverse passing off case is not whether the defendant
has encroached on one of the exclusive rights that Congress vests in the copyright owner. Indeed, in
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is not very helpful in determining who is the origin of a product in a
Reverse Passing Off case.75
2. PlaintiffMust Have Attempted to Take Credit for the Product in
Public
The gist of a Reverse Passing Off case is that defendant is taking
credit for someone else's work. Although improperly taking credit may
be wrong as a moral matter, it is not actionable by a competitor unless
that competitor can show that that credit would otherwise have come to
it.76 There can be no Reverse Passing Off claim for an anonymous
work." Accordingly, a plaintiff who distributes its product to the public
must take steps to ensure that consumers know who is the actual source
of the product. In most cases, a plaintiff takes credit by attaching its
name or trademark to, or using that name or mark in connection with, the
product.78
many of the copying cases the plaintiff's work is not protected by copyright. The real question in a
Reverse Passing Off case is one of deceit: namely, whether the law should allow defendant to tout
itself as the source of the work it is selling. Analogizing to copyright principles relating to origin is
therefore more appropriate than using principles governing infringement. Acco,-d Sergent, supra note
19, at 59-61.
Nevertheless, there is a logical inconsistency between the Ninth Circuit's bodily appropriation
standard for copying cases and the approach it uses in resale cases. In Smith, 648 F.2d 602, for
example, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to recover when its product was incorporated into a
larger work. In essence, the court held that Smith was entitled to credit for his portion of the work
notwithstanding defendant's own contribution to the final product. However, under the bodily
appropriation test, a plaintiff in a copying case has no right to credit whatsoever as long as the final
product includes some noticeable amount of defendant's own creative effort It is not entirely clear
why the plaintiff in a copying case cannot claim credit at least for those parts of the work that were
copied wholesale.
The Ninth Circuit may have resolved this inconsistency in Summit Machine Tool Manufacturing
Corp. v. Victor CNC Systems, Inc., 7 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1993). In Summit, plaintiff designed a lathe
and arranged for a manufacturer to assemble the product. Defendant purchased lathes from the same
manufacturer. Although the situation more closely resembles a resale case then a copying case, the
court applied the bodily appropriation test and denied recovery because defendant's lathes were
somewhat different. Id at 1437-38.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 190-200.
76. Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, for example, only parties who can demonstrate that they are
"likely to be damaged" by false representations can sue. A true source who does not take credit
cannot be damaged by the defendant's false claim to be the origin. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
77. Florentine Art Studio, Inc. v. Vedet K. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 532, 5,10 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
Offbeat, Inc. v. Cager, Civ. A. No. 94-2796, 1995 WL 214479, at *3 (1995 E.D. La. Apr. 11, 1995);
Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 865, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
78. Plaintiff need not use its actual name. With respect to goods sold in the market, the benefit of
receiving credit is that such credit may translate into increased future sales cf the same or similar
products. For this to occur, consumers need only know that the goods come from the same source as
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3. Defendant Falsely Designates the Origin of the Product Without
Plaintiff's Permission
Reverse Passing Off is closely related to trademark law. Both actions
seek to protect consumers from false information about the source of the
products they are buying. Therefore, some sort of false designation of
origin by defendant is a crucial element.7
9
The cases do not require that defendant explicitly claim to be the
source. Very few defendants are so direct."0 Courts have had to wrestle
with more subtle behavior that might be construed as a representation
concerning origin. The two most difficult situations are when defendant
simply attaches its own mark, or a copyright notice in its name, to the
good.81 Although both a trademark and a copyright notice provide
information relating to source, neither necessarily implies that the
trademark or copyright owner actually designed or produced the good.
After all, both trademarks and copyrights can be assigned. Most courts
agree that use of a false copyright notice, by itself, is not a false
designation of source.82 However, it is unclear whether defendant's use
of a trademark constitutes reversepassing off.83
those previously purchased; they need not know the actual identity of that source. Therefore,
plaintiffcan satisfy this element by using a trademark or pseudonym.
This requirement should be relaxed if plaintiff has not yet disseminated its product to the public. In
a case like Smith, 648 F.2d 602, for example, it would be unreasonable to require the actor to inform
the public of his role. The actor in Smith had no control over the film itself, but was merely hired to
play a role. To require the actor to inform the public of this fact would impose an undue burden.
79. Where defendant does not remove plaintiffs mark, no action will lie. CCS Communication
Control, Inc. v. Law Enforcement Assocs., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
80. Examples of the rare case involving an explicit assertion are Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d
464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995), CyberOptics Corp. v. Yamaha Motor Co., No. 3-95-1174, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12614, at *5 (D. Minn. July 29, 1996), and Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702
(S.D. Fla. 1982).
81. Use of a false patent notice, however, is actionable. The basis for liability in these cases is not
Reverse Passing Off, but § 292 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). This
provision imposes a fine of up to $500 for use of a false patent notation with the intent to counterfeit
or deceive. Subsection (b) gives the patent holder the right to sue the defendant for a portion of that
penalty. 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1994).
82. See, e.g., EFS Mktg. Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1646, 1650 (2d Cir.
1996); Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473; Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 711 (2d Cir. 1991); Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1982); United States Media
Corp. v. Edde Entertainment, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581, 1588 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Cognotec
Servs. Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 862 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Bull Publ'g Co. v.
Sandoz Nutrition Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1683 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides for criminal penalties for the improper use of the
"©" symbol. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994). However, the Copyright Act does not provide a private
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Note that defendant need not claim that it is the source in order to be
held liable. Liability can be imposed even when defendat falsely asserts
that a third party is the origin of the product. In Smith v. Montoro, for
example, plaintiff recovered when defendant substituted the name of
another actor for that of plaintiff." Reverse Passing Off, then, exists even
when defendant does not directly benefit from its false statement.
But what if defendant says absolutely nothing about the origin of its
product? At first glance, it would seem that a defendant who conveys no
false information should not be held liable for either trademark
infringement or Reverse Passing Off. The few cases thai: have discussed
the issue appear to agree." These courts draw a distinction between cases
of "misattribution," which is actionable if the other elements are
enforcement mechanism. This may explain why the courts have been hesitant to allow copyright
owners to recover for such use under some other body of law, such as the Lanham Act.
83. See supra note 19.
84. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording
Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988); Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Rock Valley
Community Press, Inc., No. 93 C 20244, 1994 WL 606171, at *1-2 (N.I. 111. Oct. 24, 1994);
Dodd v. Fort Smith Special Sch. Dist. No. 100, 666 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (W.D. Ark. 1987); By-Rite
Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 535 (D. Utah 1983). Other plaintiffs have fared
less well in their claims that the defendant gave credit to a third party for their works. See, e.g.,
Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1994); Murray v. NBC, Inc., 844 F.2d 988,
990 (2d Cir. 1988); Santrayll v. Burrell, No. 91 CIV. 3166, 1996 WL 134803, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 1996).
85. Most of the cases dealing with non-attribution come from the Southern District of New York.
The Southern District has relied on the distinction between misattribution and non-attribution in at
least three cases. See Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1071--72 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated, 760
F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., t31 F. Supp. 106, 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
There is language in a recent Second Circuit decision supporting the distinction. In Lipton v.
Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, the court rejected a reverse passing off claim where the defendant had
placed a copyright notice in its name on the item. In so doing, however, the court noted that a claim
for reverse passing off exists only where defendant makes a positive assertion of authorship. l at
473-74.
It should be noted that the concepts of misattribution and non-attribution do not correspond to the
"express" and "implied" reverse passing off labels discussed supra note 19. A misattribution can be
express, as when a seller positively states that it is the source, or implied, as when a seller merely
sells the good under its own mark or unlabelled in its stores. As long as consumers are fooled, it
should not matter whether the seller's representation is express or implied. The key question should
be whether there is a possibility of customer deception.
Commentators have also used the misattribution/non-attribution distinction. See, e.g., Edward J.
Damich, Moral Rights Protection and Resale Royalties for Visual Art in the United States:
Development and Current Status, 12 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LI.J. 387,394 (1994).
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satisfied, and mere "non-attribution," which cannot be the basis of
liability.86
From a purely moral perspective, misattribution is more objectionable
than non-attribution. The academy recognizes this principle in its code of
plagiarism. Lack of citation, although sloppy and perhaps unethical,87 is
not plagiarism. Plagiarism exists only when scholars take credit for
something that they did not produce. Distinguishing misattribution from
non-attribution also makes some sense in the commercial tort of Reverse
Passing Off. In a case of misattribution the consumer is deceived as to
the source of the product. Non-attribution, by contrast, involves no such
deception, but clearly places consumers on notice that they have the
burden of ascertaining the source.
There is, however, some precedent to the contrary. A number of cases
recognize at least the possibility of a reverse passing off claim even
where defendant makes no claim to be the source." These cases suggest
that plaintiff may have a positive right to acknowledgment of its role in
creating a product, regardless of whether defendant is attempting to
appropriate any of the benefits that might result from being perceived as
86. See cases cited supra note 85.
87. Federal law, for example, requires all institutions that apply for grants from agencies such as
the National Institute of Health to have policies covering "misconduct in science," which is defined
to include "fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those
that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting
research." 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1996); see also National Inst. of Health, Responsibilities of NIH and
Awardee Institutions for the Responsible Conduct of Research, 23 NIH Guide 44 (Dec. 16, 1994);
National Academy of Sciences, Comm. on Science, Eng'g, and Pub. Policy, On Being a Scientist:
Responsible Conduct in Research (2d ed. 1995).
88. See, e.g., Arrow United Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1982)
(defendant used plaintiff's damper with marks removed as sample); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant published its own
hymnal, but omitted copyright notice in plaintiff's name); Kasco Corp. v. General Servs., Inc., 905
F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1995) (defendant, when servicing meat chopping machines manufactured by
plaintiff, allegedly replaced knives with reconditioned knives manufactured by plaintiff); Woodke v.
Dahm, 873 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Iowa) (defendant used photograph of plaintiff's truck with mark
removed; plaintiff survived 12(b)(6) motion), aff d on other grounds, 70 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1995);
Hospital for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(defendant produced plaintiff's play; court held that merely using title is sufficient to constitute
reverse passing off).
Admittedly, it is very difficult for plaintiff to recover when defendant does not actually claim to be
the source. Accord Damich, supra note 85, at 394. However, the main reason plaintiffs lose these
cases may be that consumers are not fooled into thinking that defendants are the source of the
product that they are buying.
Washington Law Review
the origin. The right recognized in these cases is much stronger and can
be justified only by concerns other than consumer deception.s9
Finally, in both misattribution and non-attribution cases, plaintiff
cannot recover for Reverse Passing Off if it consented to defendant's
false statement concerning origin. The most common situation of consent
is the case of "private branding," where a large retailer buys goods from
a manufacturer under a contract that allows the retailer to sell the goods
under its own mark. Plaintiff's consent precludes it from challenging
defendant's false statement notwithstanding that the statement may
mislead consumers. 90
4. The False Designation is Likely to Cause Consumer Confusion
As a general proposition, of course, the law prohibits only those false
statements that deceive consumers. However, courts typically assume
that a false statement as to source will always be deceptive, because
consumers use source to judge the quality of goods in the market.9' In
this vein, it is interesting to note that courts have generally glossed over
this element in the actual cases.
5. Plaintiff Must be Harmed by the False Statement
Plaintiff must demonstrate not only that consumers were deceived, but
also that the deception resulted in injury to plaintiff. The injury in a
reverse passing off case is unlike the injury in other competition law
cases. In a typical false advertising or trademark infringement case,
plaintiffs injury is immediate-consumers who would otherwise have
89. Consumers cannot be deceived in a case of non-attribution because the defendant has made no
representation concerning the source of the product
90. Although the Second Circuit does not list "lack of consent" as an element of its test, courts in
that circuit and elsewhere consistently allow consent as a defense. See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp.,
30 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994) (contract); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526-27 (2d Cir.
1947) (assignment of copyright); Grambs v. Image Bank, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 7291, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6505, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1991) (contract); Feerick v. Arthur Young & Co., 715
F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (partnership agreement); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA
Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45, 50 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (contract); Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122
N.Y.S. 206,207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910) (publishing agreement); see also Sims ', Blanchris, Inc., 648
F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding general release of defendant bars a.tion).
91. S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275; J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 2-4 to -6 (4th ed. 1996); Elmer W.
Hanak Ill, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 363 (1974); Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 816-18 (1927);
George J. Stigler, The Economics oflnformation, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).
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purchased plaintiffs goods buy instead from defendant. Those lost
sales deprive plaintiff of profits. Plaintiff in a reverse passing off case
cannot demonstrate that same sort of injury. Even if defendant disclosed
that plaintiff is the actual source, consumers may still purchase from
defendant. In fact, defendant's admission that the product comes from
plaintiff may in many cases make consumers more likely to buy the
goods from defendant, especially if plaintiff has a reputation for
producing goods of high quality.
Courts have nevertheless had little difficulty finding this element
satisfied. Typically, they identify plaintiff's harm as a loss of future
goodwill.92 Even if plaintiff reaps no immediate gain when defendant
discloses plaintiffs role in producing the product, consumers who have
positive experiences with the product will associate the resulting
goodwill with the plaintiff. When those consumers shop in the future,
that goodwill may cause them to prefer plaintiff s goods. Plaintiff cannot
reap this future goodwill if defendant falsely represents that it is the
source.
This reasoning also helps to explain one aspect of the first element of
Reverse Passing Off, that the product must originate with the plaintiff. In
some areas of competition law, such as false advertising, any competitor
can sue a defendant who makes a false statement. Reverse Passing Off,
however, is available only to the actual source. The reason for this
restriction is that only the actual source can show a deprivation of future
goodwill. In this regard, Reverse Passing Off is more akin to trademark
infiingement, where only the trademark owner can sue.
Although not all courts phrase them in precisely the same terms, all
courts consider the above five factors in Reverse Passing Off cases. Most
of the differences that crop up in the case law concern the particulars of
the cause of action.93 Given the tremendous variety of Reverse Passing
Off cases, this consistent approach is notable. The consistency becomes
remarkable when one considers that the legal source for Reverse Passing
Off is not entirely clear. This source is the focus of the next section.
92. See e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1242 (8th Cir.
1994); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990); Arrow United, 678 F.2d at 415;
Freedman, supra note 19, at 321-23.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71 for a discussion of the disagreement between the
Second and Ninth Circuits concerning how to define the origin of a product.
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III. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR REVERSE PASSING OFF
A. The Prevailing View
Courts and commentators have devoted surprisingly little attention to
the basic question of the legal source of Reverse Passing Off. It is clear
that the claim is not a sui generis cause of action. Courts have instead
dealt with reverse passing off by fitting it within existing causes of
action. A review of the cases and commentary reveals two leading
contenders for the source of the claim: the federal Lanham Ace4 and state
unfair competition law.95
The Lanham Act is the clear favorite. That statute's main concern is
regular, not reverse, passing off. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
however, contains expansive language concerning false representations
in commerce.9 6 Courts have found section 43(a) to be a useful provision
that can be applied to a variety of deceptive acts.97 Therefore, it is no
surprise that courts have also grounded Reverse Passing Off claims in
section 43(a). In fact, every court that has faced the question has
concluded that section 43(a) provides a cause of action.9"
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
95. Section 43(a) and state unfair competition law are not the only contenders. Some plaintiffs
have cited other laws in support of the cause of action. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred, 35 F.3d 1226
(state trade secret law); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co,., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same); Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (state author-
protection law); Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co. 439 N.E.2d 526 (Il1. kpp. Ct. 1982) (state
misappropriation law), affid, 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983); Dodd v. Fort Smith Special Sch. Dist. No.
100, 666 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (federal civil rights statutes; court considers whether
§ 1983 covers reverse passing off, but rejects application of statute upon finding that federal
copyright laws provide adequate remedy); Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (antitrust laws). For a discussion of specific state statute3 providing rights of
attribution for works of art, see Damich, supra note 85, at 399.
Of course, not all of these alternative bases have been accepted, and many are limited to certain
fact situations. For a claim under trade secret law to prevail, for example, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the product incorporates a part or process that is not known by others to whom it
has potential economic value. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). That provision is quoted infra at text accom.kanying note 113.
97. Section 43(a) has been extensively used in standard false advertising cases. See, e.g., BASF
Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1994); Johnson & Johnson * Merck
Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1992); U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990). For an exhaustive analysis of the reach of the pre-
1988 version of § 43(a), see Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Compet'tion: What Should Be
the Reach of Section 43(a) ofthe Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 671 (1984).
98. See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 780 (2:1 Cir. 1994); Pioneer
Hi-Bred, 35 F.3d at 1241; Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1203 n.1
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A few courts look to state unfair competition law as the basis for the
action. Many of these cases rely on the common law tort of unfair
competition or one of its descendants. 9 Others invoke state statutes
dealing with unfair competition." ° Although most plaintiffs join their
state law claims to section 43(a) claims, a few have relied exclusively on
state law.'"'
Many reverse passing off cases also involve claims under the federal
copyright and patent laws. However, neither of these statutes actually
(7th Cir. 1990); Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990); Lamothe v. Atlantic
Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d
168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982); Campbell v. Osmond, 917 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Blank v.
Pollack, 916 F. Supp. 165, 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Kasco Corp. v. General Servs. Inc., 905 F. Supp.
29, 35 (D. Mass. 1995); Classic Font Corp. v. Fontbank, Inc., No. 94 C 607, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4647, at *3-4 (N.D. Il. Apr. 13, 1994); Beacham v. MacMillan, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 970, 977 (S.D.
Ind. 1993); Dodd, 666 F. Supp. at 1285; R.H. Donnelley Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 595 F. Supp.
1202, 1206 (N.D. Ill. 1984); By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D. Utah
1983); Hospital for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67, 73 (E.D. Va.
1980). Of course, in some of these actions the defendants ultimately prevailed. Although the courts
recognized a cause of action, they found that plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden on one or
more elements.
99. See, e.g., Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1439-42 (9th
Cir. 1993); Williams, 691 F.2d at 172-73; Universal Marine, 543 F.2d at 1108 (common law
copyright); Beacham, 837 F. Supp. at 976-78; Debs v. Meliopoulus, No. 1:90-cv-939-WCO, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864, at *50-51 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 1991); Whitney, Atwood, Norcross
Assocs.v. Architects Collaborative, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1243, 1246 (D. Mass. 1991);
Feerick v. Arthur Young & Co., 715 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Singh v. Xytel Corp., 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741, 1742 (N.D. Il. 1986); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45, 49 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Board of Trade, 439 N.E.2d at 532-37; John Wright,
Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 317-24 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified on other grounds, 587
F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978); American Precast Corp. v. Maurice Concrete Prods., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 859,
864 (D. Mass.), affd, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973).
100. See, e.g., Santrayll v. Burrell, No. 91 Civ. 3166, 1996 VL 134803, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
1996); Florentine Art Studio, Inc. v. Vedet K. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 532, 540 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Rock Valley Community Press, Inc., No. 93 C 20244, 1994
WL 606171, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1994); Debs, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864, at *48-50;
Childress v. Taylor, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Whitney, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1244; Grambs v. Image Bank, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 7291, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6505 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 1991); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 832-33 (N.D. Il. 1989), afjd on other
grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990); Singh, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1742; Yarway, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 49.
The leading statutes are the local versions of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), and Council of State Gov'ts, Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Revision, in Consumer Protection in the States app. at 31-
39(1970).
101. See, e.g., FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (although
plaintiff also alleged copyright claim, it relied solely on state law for reverse passing off); Joseph J.
Legat Architects, P.C. v. United States Dev. Corp., No. 84 C 8803, 1991 WL 38714 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 20, 1991); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 228 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div.
1962).
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creates a general cause of action for reverse passing off. The crux of a
copyright or patent claim is the copying of a product, not representations
concerning the source of that product. In fact, a defendant who copies a
copyrighted or patented item is liable even if it discloses to its customers
that plaintiff is the source."2 The high incidence of copyright and patent
claims in the reverse passing off cases is not because plaintiffs are
relying on these statutes to recover for the false rep:resentation, but
instead because so many reverse passing off claims involve the copying
of a unique and original product. 3
However, there are two narrow situations in which the patent and
copyright laws do address reverse passing off. The first involves section
292 of the Patent Act, which prohibits the use of a false patent or patent
pending notation on a product °'" Although this provision is typically
applied to a seller's use of a patent notice on goods it has produced, it
could also apply when the defendant copies or resells the goods of
another. Therefore, section 292 may provide an alternate statutory cause
of action in a few cases.
105
The second, and potentially more significant, exception is section
106A of the Copyright Act.'0 6 This provision affords certain creators of
"works of visual art" various rights, including the right to "claim
authorship" of their works even after sale of the original to another."7
102. The infringement provisions of the copyright and patent acts consider only whether
defendant reproduced the protected work or invention, not whether defendant acknowledged plaintiff
as author or inventor. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (copyright); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. 11995)
(patent).
103. Copying relates directly to Reverse Passing Off's concept of origin. Suppose that defendant,
without viewing plaintiff's product, independently creates a very similar product. Just as it is a
standard principle of copyright law that plaintiff cannot sue for infringement, see Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940), plaintiff would
also be barred from bringing a Reverse Passing Off claim, because it cannot claim to be the source of
defendant's product.
By contrast, patent infringement exists even if the defendant independently creates the product.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
104. Section 292 is essentially a criminal provision, and imposes a maximum fine of $500. 35
U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994 & Supp. 11995). However, § 292(b) gives "any person" the right to sue for
the penalty, and allows the victorious party to keep one-half of the amount recovered. 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(b) (1994).
105. The Copyright Act also imposes criminal penalties for misuse of a copyright notice.
17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994). However, this provision does not authorize any private cause of action.
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 37 n.10 (2d Cir. 1982). Some courts
have used this lack of an explicit private right of action in holding that Reverse Passing Off does not
extend to use of a false copyright symbol. See supra note 82.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
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The section 106A right is virtually identical to Reverse Passing Off.
Although no plaintiff has yet invoked section 106A in a case of reverse
passing off, it could prove to be a significant weapon in the right
situation.' °8
Section 106A, however, is too narrow to serve as a general source of
Reverse Passing Off. First, the right to claim authorship exists only with
respect to a "work of visual art,"'" which is defined as paintings,
drawings, prints, still photographs, and sculptures that are either originals
or produced in limited editions of two hundred or fewer copies."' Very
few of the reverse passing off cases that have actually been litigated
involve works that meet this definition.' Second, section 106A would
not even apply to all reverse passing off cases that involve works of
visual art. Although the statute is ambiguous on this point, the right to
claim authorship seems to apply only to works physically produced by
the artist."' Thus, section 106A does not provide a cause of action in the
108. To date, § 106A has been used only in "right to integrity" cases such as Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996), and Pavia v. 1120
Avenue of the Americas Associates, 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 106(AXa).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). The precatory language in § 106A(a) limits the
entire provision to "works of visual art," a term that is defined in § 101 to include the items listed in
the text. 17 U.S.C. § 101. In addition to the limits on numbers, § 101 requires that the work be
signed by the author, or in the case of sculpture, either signed or identified with some other
identifying feature. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
This signature requirement is important for any discussion of reverse passing off. As noted supra
in text accompanying notes 77-78, a plaintiff who does not take credit for its work cannot recover
for Reverse Passing Off.
111. Most of the cases in which the product is an artistic or literary work involve books, which
clearly lie outside the § 101 definition of a "work of visual art." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The only case
involving a product that would clearly be covered by § 106A is Morita v. Omni Publications
International, Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (sculpture), vacated, 760 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). However, as the work in that case was produced prior to 1990, § 106A did not
apply. Although Florentine Art Studio, Inc. v. Vedet K Corp., 891 F. Supp. 532 (C.D. Cal. 1995),
also involved sculpture, § 106A would not apply because plaintiff produced more than two hundred
copies, and did not sign the work.
112. Several considerations support this conclusion. First, the statute itself indicates that "the
author of a work of visual are' has the right to claim authorship "in that work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(AXa). Likewise, the definition of a "work of visual art' is phrased in terms of physical
objects---"a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture"-rather than the underlying form. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. Finally, several statements in the legislative history to § 106A indicate that Congress meant
the statute to cover only "original" works of art, i.e., those actually produced by the artist. H.R. Rep.
No. 101-514, at 12, 17 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6922, 6927; see also 2 William
F. Patry, Copyrght Law and Practice 1033 (BNA 1994).
The ambiguity arises because of some unfortunate language in § 106A(c), which sets out various
exceptions to the right to claim authorship. This section provides that the right "shall not apply to
any reproduction.., in, upon, or in connection with" items such as books, magazines, posters, and
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copying cases, which are numerically the most common type of reverse
passing off cases. Because of these significant limitations, section 106A
is also of little use in reverse passing off cases.
B. Problems with the Prevailing View
1. The Lanham Act
Courts have had little difficulty extending section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act to reverse passing off. In so doing, however, few courts have paid
much attention to the actual wording of that statute. A careful reading of
section 43(a) reveals that there are real problems in using it in reverse
passing off cases.
Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."'
Although codified as part of a trademark statute, section 43(a) reaches
far beyond the world of trademarks. For better or for worse, this
provision has proven itself to be a major weapon in controlling many
types of false representations in commerce.'
4
motion pictures. By creating an exception for certain enumerated types of reproductions, the section
implies that the right to claim authorship does apply to other forms ofreproducon.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
114. For a general discussion of that section, see S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 4C-41 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603-04; Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26, 37-38
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Reverse passing off certainly seems to qualify as a false representation
under section 43(a). By representing itself as the source of the goods,
defendant has given purchasers false information concerning an issue
that could be highly relevant to their buying decisions. Defendant's false
representation is likely to injure the actual source of the product. Section
43(a) seems to be a natural way to deal with this problem.
Although not the first case to apply section 43(a), Smith v. Montoro"5
offers perhaps the best example of how courts fit reverse passing off
within the language of the statute." 6 The court rejected the defendant's
argument that section 43(a) was intended to cover only those claims that
are directly analogous to ordinary trademark infringement, cases that
involve "regular" passing off. Instead, the court held that Congress
intended section 43(a) to extend to all deceptive practices that are
"economically equivalent" to passing off."7 That basic line of argument
guides courts to this day. Although acknowledging the differences
between regular and reverse passing off, courts nevertheless apply
section 43(a) to both. There has been relatively little analysis of the
question in recent years, with most courts simply citing Smith and other
precedent."'
The problem with this approach is that Smith and the early cases were
decided prior to the 1988 revisions to section 43(a)." 9 These
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bauer, supra note 97; Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way Baby--Too Far Maybe?, 49 Ind. L.J. 84 (1973).
115. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
116. Federal district courts had been using § 43(a) in reverse passing off cases for at least 18 years
prior to Smith. See, e.g., National Dynamics Corp. v. John Surrey, Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified on other
grounds, 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978). In these early cases, however, the courts do not analyze in any
depth how § 43(a) covers reverse passing off.
117. Smith, 648 F.2d at 605.
118. Of the recent cases, probably the most detailed discussion of how § 43(a) applies to reverse
passing off is that in Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995). Although recognizing the
existence of a cause of action under § 43(a), the court held that defendant's use of a false copyright
notice did not constitute reverse passing off within the meaning of§ 43(a).
119. Prior to the 1988 amendments, § 43(a) read in relevant part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or
any container or containers for goods, afalse designation of origin, or any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same... shall be liable to a civil action....
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), amended by Trademark Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1994) (emphasis added).
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amendments changed the statute to the current form quoted above. 2° The
main purpose of the 1988 amendments was to spell out more precisely
the types of acts covered by the section in an attempt -to solve some of
the interpretive problems that courts had been facing. 21
The 1988 amendments have in no way deterred courts from applying
section 43(a) to reverse passing off cases. To the contraly, the few courts
that have considered the question have concluded that the amendments
reinforce the conclusion that a cause of action exists. The best example
is Kasco Corp. v. General Services, Inc., 2 where the District of
Massachusetts, long the only federal court to refuse to apply section
43(a) to reverse passing off, finally joined the mainstream."n The court's
opinion indicates that it was persuaded by the 1988 amendments. It
found especially compelling a statement in the legislative history which
suggests that Congress meant the amended section 43(a) to incorporate
the judicial gloss that courts had placed on the section cver its forty-year
lifespan. 2 4 As the majority of circuits had interpreted section 43(a) to
apply to reverse passing off prior to 1988, the District of Massachusetts
held that its earlier decisions had been "consigned... lo the dustbin" of
prior jurisprudence.
But the Kasco court conceded the issue too easily. Admittedly, the
legislative history clearly and unambiguously states that Congress meant
to accept the existing case law. However, this does not necessarily mean
that Congress agreed with every application of section 43(a). In fact, the
legislative history mentions only a few particular questions, which do not
include reverse passing off. With respect to other questions, the report
states simply that Congress "expects the courts to continue to interpret
120. See supra text accompanying note 113. Section 43 was amended again in 1995 to add new
subsection (c), dealing with the "dilution" of famous marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. I 1995).
Because defendant in a reverse passing off case is by definition using its own mark, the new
"antidilution" provision is unlikely to affect reverse passing off cases. However, the court in
Childress v. Taylor, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), applied a state antidilution
statute to a case of reverse passing off, although without any real analysis of how that law could
apply.
121. S. Rep. No. 100-515 (1991), at 40-41 (1988), reprinted in 19118 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,
5603-04.
122. 905 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1995).
123. Id. at 33-34.
124. "[The 1988 amendment] revises Section 43(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) to codify the
interpretation it has been given by the courts." S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40.
125. Kasco, 905 F. Supp. at 34.
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the section."' 26 This statement is hardly strong evidence that Congress
meant for section 43(a) to reach reverse passing off. At best, the
ambiguous language suggests that Congress may not have considered the
question.
The actual language chosen for the 1988 amendments bolsters this
conclusion. Congress cleared up the prior ambiguities in the section by
explicitly listing the types of representations that are actionable. The
amended section 43(a) reaches virtually all ordinary false advertising and
regular passing off, but not reverse passing off.
In fact, the language used in the 1988 amendments actually makes it
more difficult to apply the section to reverse passing off. Before 1988,
section 43(a) allowed recovery whenever defendant made "a false
designation of origin or false designation or representation.' 27 That
general phrase, by itself, is probably broad enough to include reverse
passing off, which is literally a false statement about origin. The 1988
amendments preserved that broad language in the introductory clause.
However, in subsections (A) and (B) Congress limited that introductory
clause by listing what false representations are covered by section 43(a).
Neither of these subsections reaches reverse passing off.
a. Section 43(a)(1)(A)
Under section 43(a)(1)(A), plaintiff may recover if defendant's false
statement of origin or fact is (i) "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive" (ii) concerning either "the affiliation, connection,
or association" of defendant "with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval" of defendant's product by another person. 121
126. S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40. The only specific concern discussed in the Senate Report is that
the pre-1988 version of§ 43(a) had sometimes been applied only to claims that a party made about
its own product, not to claims it made about the products of its competitors. Id. at 40-41. The revised
§ 43(a)(l)(B) now reads in relevant part, "misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities."
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This change directly affects the problem cited in the
report.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), amended by Trademark Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1994).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994). The lack of a comma after the word "deceive" admittedly
opens the section to an alternate interpretation. Arguably, the section applies to all statements that
cause confusion or mistake, and to any statements that "deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person." However, that interpretation is illogical. There is no reason why
Congress would want to limit recovery for deceptive statements, but not for statements that cause
confusion or mistake. Assuming, in order to avoid redundancy, that deception means something
different than mistake and confusion, it must imply some element of intent on the part of the speaker.
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Fitting reverse passing off into this precise language is problematic in
several regards. 9 The most fundamental problem is that reverse passing
off cannot satisfy the second part of the test. A defendant who engages in
reverse passing off in no way suggests that it is in any way affiliated,
connected, or associated with plaintiff, or that its product originates from
or is sponsored or approved by plaintiff. To the contrary, defendant has
intentionally omitted any reference to the plaintiff. Because of the
explicit statutory restrictions, reverse passing off does not fit within
section 43(a)(1)(A).
b. Section 43(a)(1)(B)
Subsection (B) deals with false advertising involving matters other
than the identity of the source.13 Unlike subsection (A), Congress here
chose fairly broad language. In order to prevail under subsection (B), a
plaintiff merely needs to show that defendant made a false statement in a
commercial advertisement that "misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another pers3on's goods."''
One scholar has suggested that section 43(a)(1)(B) is a better source
for Reverse Passing Off.' The gist of the argument is that a defendant
who engages in reverse passing off misrepresents the "nature" or
"qualities" of its goods. Shoppers who know that the goods actually
came from the plaintiff can use their knowledge of plaintiff's reputation
to estimate the quality of the product. If defendant substitutes its name
for plaintiff's, shoppers can no longer use the trademark to judge quality.
Congress could not have intended to allow some categories of intentionally false speech, while
barring all categories of speech that inadvertently causes mistake or conftision. Therefore, the
categories listed in part (ii) in the text must modify all three verbs in part (i).
129. As in any discussion of Reverse Passing Off, one problem is determining what the statute
means by the undefined term "origin." Although plaintiff is almost certainly the origin of the product
in a resale case, its claim is less persuasive in the copying cases.
A second problem is ascertaining whether consumers are deceived by defendant's claim.
"Deception" implies some detriment. In a reverse passing off case, although consumers may be
misled, it is unclear whether they suffer any harm. See infra text accompanying notes 191-97;
Sergent, supra note 19, at 70-71.
130. Subsection (B) provides that a person shall be liable if "in commercial advertising or
promotion, [he or she] misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his
or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
132. Freedman, supra note 19, at 306. Note that Freedman wrote her article before Congress
amended § 43(a), so what she refers to as § 43(aX2) is now § 43(a)(1)(b). Se,? Trademark Remedy
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There are several flaws with this argument. First, the argument
assumes that defendant's claim to be the source is a statement concerning
the "nature" or "qualities" of the good. Trademarks do provide buyers
with information about quality. The main function of a trademark is to
allow consumers to tap into their experience with a known source to
judge the quality of goods they are considering.' 3 The problem with
section 43(a)(1)(B), however, is that it is not meant to cover
representations as to the identity of the origin, even though consumers do
use those representations as a way to judge quality. The subsection
specifically mentions "geographic origin." Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius: this reference to one particular type of origin means that it is
unlikely that Congress meant the term "nature" or "qualities" to refer to
the identity of the origin. Moreover, because statements as to the identity
of the origin are already covered in section 43(a)(1)(A), extending
subsection (B) to statements about the identity of the source would
bypass the explicit limitations that Congress placed on such statements in
section 43(a)(1)(A). A better interpretation, one that considers section
43(a)(1) as a whole, is that statements involving the identity of a
product's origin fall exclusively with the ambit of subsection (A), which,
as demonstrated just above, cannot be used to deal with reverse passing
off. Section 43(a)(1)(B), by contrast, deals only with statements about
the product itself, including geographic origin, which means that it also
cannot be used in reverse passing off cases.
Second, even if Congress meant for subsection (B) to encompass
statements concerning the identity of the origin, that subsection imposes
liability only on defendants who misrepresent the quality of the product.
By itself, a name or trademark says little about quality. 3 4 Consumers
nevertheless rely on marks to judge the quality of the products that they
encounter in the market. Consumers do this by assuming that a branded
product will be roughly the same quality as similar products bearing that
same mark that they have previously purchased. Therefore, reverse
passing off misrepresents the quality of a product only if the product
does not meet the reputation that defendant has for products of that
nature. In many cases, defendant's mark has no reputation whatsoever.
133. Schechter, supra note 91, at 818-19.
134. Of course, there are exceptions. If a seller sells several grades of a product, and labels one
with a mark like 'PREMIER," use of the mark may well convey a message that the product is of
better-than-average quality.
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And even if defendant has acquired a reputation, there is no deception if
the goods that defendant sells meet or exceed that reputation.'35
A careful reading of section 43(a) therefore indicates that it simply
does not cover reverse passing off. Although the statute is meant to cover
a wide variety of problems, it does have its limits. Whether Congress
chose its words because it meant to exclude reverse passing off, or
simply because it did not consider the doctrine while it was drafting, it is
clear that the Lanham Act does not provide a cause of action. 36
2. State Law
State unfair competition law takes many forms. However, most
reverse passing off plaintiffs rely either on the common law or one of
various state statutes, such as the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act'37 and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(UTPCPL),' that build upon the common law.'39 These various state
laws all deal with the same basic types of activities, but differ in their
particulars.
a. Applying State Unfair Competition Law to Reverse Passing Off
Most of the state statutes are worded broadly enough to support a
cause of action. For example, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
prohibits acts that cause a "likelihood of confusion or of
135. In fact, if defendant has resold plaintiff's products for some time, defendant's reputation will
be determined by the quality ofplaintifJ's goods.
136. Courts have proven quite willing to bend the literal language of § 43(a). They recognize that
Congress meant § 43(a) to deal not with certain enumerated fact situations, but instead with an entire
genre of unfair competition cases. See Bauer, supra note 97. If reverse passing off fits into this
genre, courts should interpret § 43(a) to provide a cause of action notwithstar ding the limits of the
language chosen by Congress.
However, this argument fails in its premise. The basic goals of the Lanhwn Act are to protect
consumers against deception and to ensure that competitors receive the gooc~will that is rightfully
theirs. S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1271, 1274. As discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 190-203, Reverse Passing Off accomplishes neither of these ends.
137. 7A U.L.A. 265 (1985).
138. Council of State Gov'ts, supra note 100, at 31-39.
139. See, e.g., CD Law Inc. v. LawWorks Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(common law conversion, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and state's version of Uniform
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law); Debs v. Meliopoulus, No. 1:9D-cv-939-WCO, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19864 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 1991) (state version of Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act); Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (common
law claim), afJ'd, 456 N.E.2d 84 (111. 1983).
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misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification
of goods or services.', 40 Because this language does not contain the
limitations present in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the statute can be
extended to reverse passing off. The UTPCPL is worded even more
generally, reaching all "deceptive" practices.' 4' Reverse passing off
arguably deceives consumers by misrepresenting the source of the
commodity that they are purchasing. 1
42
Fitting reverse passing off into the common law is more difficult. The
recently-enacted Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition does contain
an entire section dealing explicitly with reverse passing off. Section 5
provides in relevant part:
One is subject to liability to another.., if, in marketing goods or
services manufactured, produced, or supplied by the other, the actor
makes a representation likely to deceive or mislead prospective
purchasers by causing the mistaken belief that the actor or a third
person is the manufacturer, producer, or supplier of the goods or
services if the representation is to the likely commercial detriment
of the other. 43
This language contains a pair of important limitations. First, because
the section requires that the goods in question actually be "manufactured,
produced, or supplied" by the plaintiff, reverse passing off would be
actionable only in resale cases, not in copying cases. Second, the section
requires that defendant make a positive statement claiming to be the
origin. The comments to section 5 indicate that merely substituting
defendant's trademark for plaintiff's will not suffice.'" If section 5
accurately depicts the current state of the common law, Reverse Passing
Off is much narrower than the rule applied in many cases.
140. Unif. Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 2(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 265 (1985) (emphasis added).
141. Council of State Gov'ts, supra note 100, at 31-39. Section 2 is the key section of the
UTPCPL. This section has three alternatives, all of which reach deceptive practices. In addition,
alternatives one and three prohibit "unfair" trade practices. It is possible to argue that reverse passing
off is unfair to consumers, by shifting to them the burden of ascertaining the true source of the
product. Cf. In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (holding that under § 5 of Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, after which UTPCPL is patterned, seller making true but
unsubstantiated claim is unfair trade practice because it would shift burden to consumers). As
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 199-200, however, this same unfairness exists in other
forms of branding practices that are widely accepted in many industries.
142. Whether deception really matters is an issue that will be addressed infra at text
accompanying notes 190-200.
143. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 5 (1995).
144. Id. § 5 cmt. b. The same reasoning suggests that use of a false copyright or patent notice
would not be actionable under common law.
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b. Preemption
But finding an applicable state law is only the first step. Reverse
Passing Off primarily protects those who create products. These products
almost invariably fall within the subject matter of the copyright or patent
laws. 4 Therefore, Reverse Passing Off arguably encroaches on the
domain of the federal copyright and patent laws. These federal laws may
preempt state law if the encroachment is too great. Because different
rules govern copyright and patent preemption, it is necessary to analyze
each separately.
c. Copyright Preemption
Section 301 of the Copyright Act explicitly defines the scope of
copyright preemption. 46 There are actually two separate preemption
provisions in section 301. Subsection (a) is the general preemption
provision that applies in most cases. In 1990, however, Congress added a
separate and narrower preemption provision, section 301(f) 47 With
certain narrow exceptions, both provide that a state law is preempted if it
is equivalent to various rights vested by the Copyright Act. The
difference between the two sections lies in the type of rights covered by
each. Section 301(a) covers state law rights that are equivalent to any of
the general rights of copyright holders listed in section 106. Section
301(f), on the other hand, deals with state law rights that are equivalent
to the special rights afforded certain visual artists in section 106A. As
discussed above, 4 ' section 106A, unlike section 106, creates a right of
"authorship" that is closely akin to Reverse Passing Off.'49 Therefore,
section 301(f) is more likely than section 301(a) to preempt state reverse
passing off laws.
145. Most of the cases cited in this Article involve either a work of authorship within the subject
matter of copyright or a utilitarian product or process within the subject matter of patent law. Of
course, the plaintiff's product will not always qualify for patent or copyright. protection. See, e.g.,
Murray v. NBC, Inc., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988) (general idea for situation comedy); Board of
Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526 (I1. App. Ct. 1982) (stock market index), affd, 456
N.E.2d 84 (fIl. 1983).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
147. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5131, 5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (1994)).
148. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). Section 106A(a)(1)(A) provides that the author of certain works
has the right "to claim authorship of that work." For a discussion of this § 106A right and its
similarity to Reverse Passing Off, see supra at text accompanying notes 108-12.
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In practice, the preemptive scope of section 301(f) is relatively
narrow. It applies only when a state law is being used to protect a "work
of visual art," a fairly restricted category of works. 5 Therefore, section
301(f) clearly does not prevent a state from allowing recovery for reverse
passing off in the typical case in which plaintiff's work would not
qualify as a work of visual art.'
States probably also have the power to act even when a work of visual
art is involved. First, section 301(f) only precludes states from granting
equivalent rights in the actual work of art produced by the artist.'52 States
are therefore not precluded by section 301(f) from imposing liability in a
copying-type reverse passing off case, even if it involves a work of
visual art. Second, section 301(f) exempts from preemption state laws
that create rights that extend beyond the life of the artist.
Because of these limitations, the scope of section 301(f) preemption
on state law Reverse Passing Off is extremely narrow. Basically, states
are precluded from regulating cases in which defendant resells or
otherwise markets"M a work of visual art produced by plaintiff, and then
only during the life of the artist. Although no court has yet faced the
question, the right granted to the plaintiff in a Reverse Passing Off case
is certainly equivalent to the section 106A right to claim authorship.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1). The § 101 definition of "work of visual art" is discussed supra text
accompanying note 110.
Section 301(0 prevents states from protecting certain limited categories of works. It is irrelevant
whether the work in question is actually protected under the copyright laws. Cf H.R. Rep. No.
101-514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931.
151. Very few litigated cases have involved works of visual art. See supra note 111.
152. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
153. Section 301(f)(2)(C) provides an exception for state laws that deal with "activities violating
legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the author." 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(c). Thus,
a state could clearly require acknowledgment of the plaintiff's contribution after the plaintiff's death.
In fact, it might even be able to regulate acknowledgment during the life of the author, for there is a
serious ambiguity in § 301(f)(2XC). That section focuses on the duration of the state law right, not
the time at which the infringing activities occur. In other words, as long as the state drafts a law
covering Reverse Passing Off that allows the claim to survive the death of the plaintiff, it can
apparently deal with all "activities" that impair that right, regardless of when those activities occur.
Although that interpretation seems to defy the legislature's intent by allowing for a parallel right
during the author's lifetime, it is the most honest interpretation of the statutory language.
154. Section 301(f) would also preempt state law in a "sample" case, where defendant copies
plaintiff's design, but markets its copy by showing potential customers a good actually produced by
plaintiff. Although the defendant in these cases does copy, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is
not the copying, but instead defendant's use of the original product. Moreover, the § 301(f) right to
claim authorship applies regardless of whether the defendant actually sells the product. Therefore,
although no sample cases involving works of visual art have yet arisen-or are likely to arise-these
cases should be treated the same as resale cases for purposes of preemption.
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Allowing a parallel state action in this narrow situation would defeat one
of Congress's goals in enacting section 106A, which was to encourage
uniformity among the states by providing a single, federal cause of
action.15
5
Of course, it is still necessary to consider the general preemption
provisions of section 301(a). Unlike section 301(f), section 301(a) deals
with all works that fall within the subject matter of the copyright laws.1 6
The crucial question under section 301(a) is whether the right to prevent
reverse passing off is equivalent to any of the general rights given
copyright holders by section 106.157
No court requires perfect equivalence between the state law and
section 106 rights. Most courts apply the "extra element" test to
determine equivalence.158 If the state law claim includes an element that
does not apply in a copyright claim, and that extra element makes the
state law claim qualitatively different from a copyright claim, the state
claim is not preempted. 1 9
Several courts have applied this analysis to the question of whether
state law Reverse Passing Off is preempted by section 301(a). Most,
155. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 9, 21. There are admittedly certain statemm.nts in the legislative
history which suggest that state law Reverse Passing Off would not be preempted. For example, in
discussing § 301(f) the House Report states: "Further, State law causes of action such as those for
misappropriation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices, are not
currently preempted under § 301, and they will not be preempted under the proposed law." Id at 21.
Given that courts use some version of unfair competition law as the basis for most state law reverse
passing off claims, this language might suggest that a state reverse passing off law based on unfair
competition would not be preempted even if the plaintiff was trying to protect a work of visual art.
However, such an interpretation would render the actual language of § 301(f) meaningless, for it is
difficult to imagine a right that is more "equivalent" to a right of attribution. The label that the state
places on its cause of action certainly should not control the question of preeaption. The very next
sentence of the Report supports this conclusion: "On the other hand, if a State attempts to grant an
author the rights of attribution or integrity for works of visual art as defined in this Act those laws
will be preempted." Id. Although unfair competition laws in general are not preempted, a state law
that specifically requires acknowledgment would be.
156. Like § 301(f), § 301(a) preempts state attempts to protect a work regardless of whether it is
currently protected under the copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
158. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1226 (1 1th Cir.
1983); Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law 1-35
(1992).
159. See supra note 158. For recent examples of this test in practice in an area other than Reverse
Passing Off, see United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees, 104 F.3d 1453, 1463-64 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that state conversion claim was preempted by federal copyright law), and Harold's
Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1543-44 (10th Cir.) (holding that state
antitrust claim was not preempted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 297 (1996).
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including the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, have found various
state laws preempted." ° Professor Nimmer seconds this conclusion. 1'
Only the Northern District of Illinois has consistently upheld certain state
law claims of reverse passing off against preemption.162
Notwithstanding the numbers, the Northern District of Illinois seems
to have the better of the argument. State law reverse passing off almost
always includes an important extra element that makes it qualitatively
different than any of the rights granted by section 106 of the Copyright
160. See, e.g., Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., 14 F.3d 596, 1993 WL 509876, at *6-7 (4th Cir. Dec. 8,
1993) (unfair competition and unjust enrichment); Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 665-66
(2d Cir. 1993) (statutory and common law unfair competition); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (unfair competition and misrepresentation); American Movie Classics
Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (unfair competition);
FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334, 1358-64 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (state law
misrepresentation and tortious interference); Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 498,
504-05 (S.D.N.Y.) (unfair competition), vacated inpart, 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994); CD Law Inc. v.
LawWorks Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352, 1354-56 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (unfair competition,
conversion, unjust enrichment, and state consumer protection statute); Xerox Corp. v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1512, 1518-19 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (unfair competition and
unjust enrichment); Bull Publ'g Co. v. Sandoz Nutrition Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1683
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (state unfair competition statute); Peckarsky v. ABC, Inc. 603 F. Supp. 688, 695-
96 (D.D.C. 1984) (state law right of attribution); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474
F. Supp. 672, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (common law unfair competition); see also Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating in dictum that unfair competition would be preempted;
applying Sears/Compco test for patent presumption instead of § 301).
161. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B][1][e], at 1-24
n.110 (1996).
162. See Joseph J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. United States Dev. Corp., No. 84 C 8803, 1991 WL
38714 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1991) (statutory and common law unfair competition); Stillman v. Leo
Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (unfair competition). However, not all state claims
will survive preemption. In three other cases, the Northern District found that state law
misappropriation claims are preempted, even when applied to acts of reverse passing off. Gannett
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Rock Valley Community Press, Inc., No. 93 C 20244, 1994 WL
606171 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1994) (holding that state law misappropriation is preempted, but statutory
deceptive trade practices claim is not); FASA Corp., 869 F. Supp. 1334; Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704
F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ill. 1989), a]j'don other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990).
The Southern District of New York once agreed with the Northern District of Illinois, but appears
to have changed its mind. In Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the
Southern District allowed a state Reverse Passing Off claim based on New York's antidilution act,
but found a parallel claim under the state's artists authorship rights law to be preempted. Tracy, 697
F. Supp. at 750-51. The Southern District's later opinions in Waldman, 848 F. Supp. at 505, in 1994
and American Movie Classics, 922 F. Supp. at 934, in 1996 both concluded, without citing Tracy,
that Reverse Passing Off claims were preempted. Although neither case involved the antidilution
statute (and American Movie Classics, contrary to what the court concluded, did not even appear to
involve reverse passing oft), the court's reasoning in each case probably supplants the conclusion in
Tracy. And even if Tracy is not implicitly overturned, it is difficult to understand how reverse
passing off could be actionable under an antidilution statute.
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Act. 63 This extra element is defendant's false representation that
defendant is the source of the product. It is this false representation, not
the act of copying, that forms the crux of the cause of action.
Copying is also a sine qua non of reverse passing off, at least in the
copying cases. But the defendant in a copying-type reverse passing off
case is not penalized for copying. It is penalized for misleading the
public.1" If the defendant simply admits at the outset that it has copied
the plaintiff's good, courts will not impose liability for reverse passing
off.65 This makes Reverse Passing Off fundamentally different from any
of the copyright rights, under which it is immaterial whether defendant
discloses that plaintiff is the source.
Some courts dealing with section 301(a) preemption also apply a
"goals" analysis, under which they compare the goals of the state law
with the goals of copyright law.'66 This approach bolsters the conclusion
that state law Reverse Passing Off is not preempted. The goal of
copyright is to encourage creative activity by granting authors a limited
monopoly in their works. Reverse Passing Off, by contrast, has two
primary objectives. One is to minimize consumer confusion concerning
the source of products in the marketplace. 67 The copyright laws have
nothing whatsoever to do with this problem. The other goal of reverse
passing off is to ensure that the source of the product receives all of the
goodwill that flows from the design of the product.'68 Although a
copyright holder also receives that future goodwill-after all, a
monopolist will by definition receive all of the goodwill associated with
a product-there is no indication that Congress considered this future
163. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
164. In fact, Kregos, 3 F.3d 656, which is probably the leading case finding preemption, can be
explained away on this basis. The Kregos court explicitly found that the New York law of unfair
competition did not require the plaintiff to prove any deceptive statement Id at 666. Plaintiff could
prevail merely by showing copying without permission, which is exactly the same showing as it
would have to make in a copyright infringement case.
The district court in Waldman missed this point. In that case, the plaintiff argued that New York's
common law of unfair competition did require proof of a misleading statement. The court dismissed
the case based on the authority of Kregos, without reviewing state law. Although plaintiff would
have had to demonstrate that New York common law had changed in the five y, ars since Kregos, the
court should at least have allowed plaintiff to present the argument.
165. See, e.g., CCS Communication Control, Inc. v. Law Enforcement Asso, s., Inc., 628 F. Supp.
1457, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding no cause of action where defendant leavas plaintiff's mark on
product).
166. See, e.g., Gannett Satellite, 1994 WL 606171, at *6; Stillman, 720 F. Supp. at 1362.
167. See supra text accompanying note 91.
168. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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goodwill to be an important part of the incentive provided by the limited
monopoly of copyright. In fact, just the opposite is true. Under the "first
sale" doctrine of copyright, a person who legally obtains a copy of a
copyrighted work is free to sell that copy without infringing the
copyright.'69 As the monopoly afforded by copyright ends at the initial
sale, Congress clearly did not mean to give the author the right to capture
future goodwill.
The very existence of section 301(f) also suggests that section 301(a)
does not preempt state reverse passing off laws. That Congress elected to
draft a separate section covering the right of attribution is strong
evidence that it did not consider the right to be included within the
existing section 106. If the right of attribution is not encompassed in
section 106, section 301(a) has no effect on a state law that provides such
a right.
Therefore, although they are precluded from regulating resale cases
involving works of visual art, states are otherwise free to limit all types
of reverse passing off in cases involving products within the subject
matter of copyright. The only possible exception would be a state law
that did not include as an element a false statement by the defendant
concerning the source. For example, if a state tried to fit reverse passing
off within the tort of misappropriation, the claim might well be
preempted. Misappropriation imposes liability on the mere act of
copying, regardless of whether that copying misleads the public. In this
context, it is interesting to note that several of the cases that concluded
that state law was preempted dealt with a form of the tort of general
misappropriation. 7
169. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
In Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (N.D. Ala. 1996), the court
found that the federal first sale doctrine was a defense in an action based on state law. Id. at 1469. As
a result, the defendant was held not liable under state law for harm that it had caused to the plaintiff
when it resold a product that it purchased from plaintiff.
Although Allison does represent an alternate way to find state law preempted, it should have little
impact in state law Reverse Passing Off cases. The plaintiff's claim in that case was based upon the
right of publicity. Plaintiff argued that it was entitled to profits that defendant earned by reselling
certain plaques decorated with photographs of the plaintiff. Id. In essence, plaintiff was demanding
all of the profits from the resale itself. If a court were to allow the claim, it would directly undermine
the § 109 "first sale" exception. In a Reverse Passing Off case, by contrast, the plaintiff is not asking
for the profits from the resale, but instead simply demanding that its name be left on the product
when the product is resold. Although this demand is admittedly a condition on resale, it does not
deprive defendant of the value of the product.
170. As discussed supra note 162, the Northern District of Illinois agreed that state law
misappropriation claims are preempted. See Gannett Satellite, 1994 WL 606171, at *5; FASA
Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1334, 1361-62 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704
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d. Patent Preemption
The patent statute 7' does not explicitly list the standards for
preemption. The law of patent preemption has instead been developed in
a series of Supreme Court cases. 7 2 Although the law is not entirely
settled, the scope of patent preemption is roughly the same as under
section 301(a) of the Copyright Act. The predominant analysis closely
resembles the "goals" analysis used by a few courts in conastruing section
301.P3 According to Bonito Boats,74 the Supreme Court's most recent
analysis of the question, states cannot reward inventors by giving them
exclusive rights in their functional inventions. 75 States may, however,
prohibit copying of those inventions if "necessary to promote goals
outside the contemplation of the federal patent scheme,"'76 such as
limiting customer confusion 7 or encouraging morality in competition.' 8
As in copyright, the product need only lie within the general subject
matter of the patent laws; it is irrelevant whether it actually would
qualify for a patent.'79
Very few cases have addressed the question of whether the patent laws
preempt state law Reverse Passing Off. However, both the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have concluded that certain state laws are not
preempted.8 These courts are correct. The goals of the patent laws are
F. Supp. 823, 835 (N.D. Il. 1989), afdon other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990). Similarly,
although phrased as an unfair competition claim, the state law claim that the ourt found preempted
in Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993), did not require plaintiff to prove a false
statement. Id. at 666.
More generally, however, there is an ongoing debate about whether §j 301 preempts state
misappropriation laws. See generally Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 161, at 1-28.
171. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
172. The leading cases, in chronological order, are Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964), Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653 (1969), Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), and Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
173. See supra text accompanying note 166.
174. 489 U.S. 141.
175. Id. at 157-58.
176. Id. at 166.
177. Id. at 165; see also Tveter v. AB Tum-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 1990).
178. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155-56 (1989); see also
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
179. In Sears, 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964), and Compco, 376 U.S. 234, 235 (1964), for example,
patents had been obtained, but had been declared invalid in the course of the lawsuit.
180. See Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding misappropriation claim was preempted, but unfair competition claims were not preempted);
750
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basically the same as those of copyright-to encourage invention by
providing a strong financial incentive to the inventor.18 As discussed
above, state law Reverse Passing Off neither conflicts with nor overlaps
this basic goal. Reverse Passing Off does not provide any sort of a
monopoly to the plaintiff. The law allows defendant to copy plaintiffs
product freely, only asking it to admit what it has done. Accordingly,
neither the patent nor the copyright laws preclude states from regulating
reverse passing off, at least in those cases where the state law cause of
action requires a false statement by the defendant.
1 2
But merely because states can regulate reverse passing off does not
necessarily mean that they should. By definition, giving rights to one
competitor restricts others. Such a restriction is warranted only if it is
offset by other benefits to society. The next section will address whether
recognizing a cause of action for reverse passing off is a wise policy
choice.
IV. SHOULD REVERSE PASSING OFF BE ACTIONABLE?
Reverse Passing Off has enjoyed a warm reception. The doctrine has
been invoked in cases ranging from the resale of industrial machinery to
the copying of works of art and literature. However, most courts have
accepted the cause of action without really considering whether the cause
of action is desirable. Most courts simply cite Smith v. Montoro83 or one
of the other early reverse passing off decisions as supporting the claim.
However, even these early cases do not really consider the policy issues
presented by the cause of action.
Allowing the plaintiff to recover for reverse passing off certainly
"feels" right. The defendant, after all, has lied to the public by falsely
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that
misappropriation claim was not preempted). However, the precedential value of both cases is subject
to question. Truck Equipment was decided prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Bonito
Boats, a case that put teeth back into the preemption analysis. The discussion of preemption in
Summit, by contrast, must be considered dictum. Although plaintiff had alleged both a § 43(a) and a
state law Reverse Passing Off claim, the court rejected the claims on the merits. Summit, 7 F.3d at
1442. Moreover, the only authority that the Summit court cites for its statement about preemption is
Tveter, 633 F.2d 831, a case involving ordinary, not reverse, passing off. States clearly retain the
power to regulate ordinary passing off.
181. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480.
182. The only possible exception would be a state attempt to impose liability for the false use of a
patent symbol. Because § 292 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1994), specifically deals with that
issue, see supra text accompanying note 104, it in all likelihood preempts state law in this area.
183. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
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taking credit for something it did not create. There is a strong flavor of
unfairness here; where a defendant, in the oft-quoted words of Justice
Pitney in INS,184 "is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown."' 5 By
the same token, the law asks very little of the defendant. Reverse Passing
Off does not question the defendant's ability to resell or copy the good;
rather, it simply asks the defendant to disclose what it has done.
These vague feelings of impropriety, however, are not enough to
justify a cause of action. The world of commerce is replete with
situations in which people reap where they have not soin. Commercial
success invariably breeds imitation. Not all of these situations of
copying-in fact, only a small minority-are actionable. Before making
an exception to this general principle for reverse passing off, it is
important to consider the harms caused by a defendant who makes a false
claim of origin.
A. Policy Considerations
A few courts and commentators have attempted to analyze the policy
issues underlying reverse passing off.'86 Two basic concerns regularly
arise in these discussions.18 7 First, reverse passing off supposedly
deceives consumers as to the source of the products they are purchasing.
Second, a defendant who claims to be the source of a product benefits
from the goodwill that consumers develop towards that product. Whether
these concerns are genuine, and whether a cause of aotion addresses
them, are the real issues.
1. Consumer Deception
Proponents of the cause of action argue that allowing a plaintiff to sue
helps to prevent defendants from deceiving consumers. However, there
are several flaws with this argument. First, it is by no means clear that a
defendant who sells another's product under defendant's own name or
mark is making a false statement. Second, any misrep:resentation that
184. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
185. Id. at239.
186. Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990); Smith, 648 F.2d at 607; Blazon, Inc. v.
DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Borchard, supra note 17, at 9-10,
Freedman, supra note 19, at 319-23; Rittenberg, supra note 19, at 1763; Sergrmt, supra note 19, at
56-59,68-77.
187. Rittenberg, supra note 19, at 1763, offers four policy justifications. However, all four are
merely variations on the two themes set out in the text.
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may occur may well be immaterial. Finally, it is impossible to
distinguish the deception involved in reverse passing off from other
common marketing practices that are perfectly acceptable.
A statement is "deceptive" if it is both false and likely to mislead the
audience." 8 Situations of reverse passing off may not satisfy either of
these criteria. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish two types of
reverse passing off cases. In most cases, defendant's representation
involves attaching its name or trademark to the product or selling the
product in its store or catalog. In a few cases, defendant goes one step
further by expressly stating that it is the origin."9
A defendant that simply sells a good under its own name or mark has
not necessarily made a false statement.' 9° The statement is false only if
consumers perceive it as a representation concerning the actual origin of
the product. Someone who buys a branded product does not
automatically assume that the seller personally designed or produced the
product. In today's economy, with its vast distribution chains and large
retailers, consumers are accustomed to buying goods that are produced
by unknown people. Therefore, defendant's use of its name or mark may
not be interpreted as an indication of origin. If not, it is not "false"
merely because it does not name plaintiff.
In some cases, though, consumers will conclude that defendant is the
origin, either because they assume that the seller must also be the origin,
or because defendant has made some express claim to be the origin. Even
here, however, consumer deception does not necessarily exist.
Admittedly, consumers rely on marks and express statements to ascertain
the source of the products that they are buying, and rely heavily on that
knowledge in their purchasing decisions. However, it is important to
consider exactly why knowing the source is important. Ordinary
consumers are not interested in learning the name of the true source
merely to sate their curiosity.191 Instead, consumers want to know the
source simply because it provides them a shorthand way to gauge the
188. See In re Shapely, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72, 73 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (interpreting word
"deceptive" in § 2 of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982)); In re Quady Winery, Inc., 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1213, 1214 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (same); see also In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C.
110 (1984) (interpreting word "deceptive" under § 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1982)); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 3 (1995).
189. See, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995); Marling v. Ellison, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702,705 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
190. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 5 cmt. b.
191. Of course, there are exceptions. For example, some people may desire to buy a product
produced by a friend or neighbor.
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quality of the product that they are considering. 92 Therefore, from the
perspective of the consumer, the source of a product is the party most
responsible for the ultimate quality of that product. 3 Unlike the more
philosophical question of origin underlying a patent or copyright, the
consumer's perception of source may well differ depending on a variety
of factors.
For example, in copying cases consumers may actually consider the
defendant, rather than the plaintiff, the best indication of quality. Of
course, the quality of a given product is determined both by its design
and by the skill with which it was constructed. However, consumers can
generally evaluate the design of a product by visual or other inspection.
Quality of manufacture is often much more difficult to judge. Consumers
therefore want to know the name of the actual manufacturer, which in the
copying cases is the defendant. In fact, attaching plainliff's name to a
good manufactured by defendant may actually prove more deceptive,
especially if the quality of the goods manufactured by plaintiff and
defendant differ significantly.
The resale cases are slightly more difficult, because; in these cases
plaintiff controls the manufacture. Whether defendant's claim to be the
origin is false in these cases often turns on the nature of the product. For
some products, especially durable goods, the reputation of the actual
manufacturer provides the best indication of quality. For others,
however, it is more important to know the reputation of others in the
distribution chain. Most consumers purchasing milk, for example, are
more interested in knowing who processed, shipped, and stored that
perishable product than knowing who owns the cows. Even for durable
goods, a consumer may prefer certain retailers over others because of
superior service and post-sale support. In all of these cases, a defendant
who holds itself out as the "source" does not necessarily mislead the
consuming public, for in the eyes of consumers it may well be that the
defendant's role is more important in ascertaining quality.
Finally, even if it is undisputed that plaintiff has played a greater role
in the quality of the product, reverse passing off does not necessarily
deceive consumers. Consider again how consumers use trademarks and
192. Knowledge of the source of the product is especially useful if the consumer has dealt with
that seller before when purchasing the same or similar goods. For more detailed expositions of how
sellers and buyers communicate through the use of marks, see Schechter, supra note 91, at 815-19,
and see generally Hanak, supra note 91.
193. Borchard, supra note 17, at 4 n.7, suggests in passing that Reverse Passing Off can be
justified in terms of a consumer's right to know the ultimate source of the product purchased. This
analysis confuses the concepts of physical origin and the consumer's perceptions of origin.
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other indicia of source when making purchasing decisions. Consumers
choosing among competing commodities rely on the reputation of the
source to judge quality."9 A consumer who sees a product branded XYZ
expects that the product will be as good as the reputation of the owner of
the mark XYZ. The consumer is deceived if the product is not as good as
the reputation.
Under the above analysis, regular passing off clearly presents a
potential for deception. In the ordinary case of passing off, plaintiff owns
the mark XYZ and defendant sells its product under the same or a
confusingly similar mark. Because defendant's products ordinarily will
not match the quality associated with the plaintiff, defendant's use of
XYZ is both false and misleading.195
In a case of reverse passing off, by contrast, consumers assume that
the product comes from the defendant. If defendant has no reputation for
quality, a situation that is fairly common in the cases, consumers are not
deceived because they have no specific expectations concerning the
quality of the product."9 Nor is there deception even in the less frequent
case where defendant has acquired a reputation. Defendant's reputation
is defined mainly by its history in dealing. with products of a particular
type. Because defendants in reverse passing off cases are selling products
from a "single" source-admittedly the plaintiff-the product will, by
definition, be as good as consumers expect, as long as defendant
continues to resell plaintiff's goods.19' Use of defendant's own mark
therefore does not deceive consumers.
194. This perceived reputation may arise from several sources, including advertising, a
consumer's own experiences with the product, the recommendations or warnings of others who have
used the product, and the reports of testing agencies.
195. The representation is not misleading if the plaintiff has not yet acquired a reputation.
Trademark law nevertheless prohibits ordinary passing off even in this situation because defendant
has destroyed the potential for efficient communication through the trademark.
196. Consumers may have a general expectation of quality from the mere fact that the product is
sold under defendant's name or mark. As a general proposition, consumers may well assume that
branded goods are of a generally higher quality than unbranded items. After all, few sellers would
want to take credit for very low-quality goods. However, reverse passing off does not deceive
consumers as to this general representation of quality. In fact, consumers are doubly protected- for
not only defendant but plaintiffdeems the good of sufficient quality to claim to be the origin.
197. Of course, if defendant resells goods obtained from several different sources, consumer
expectations will not be satisfied. None of the reverse passing off cases present such a situation.
Even if the situation were to arise, the resulting "deception" would not alone be grounds for
imposing liability. The problem of varying quality is not unique to reverse passing off. The law of
trademarks has never adequately addressed the issue of a seller whose goods are not of consistent
quality.
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This argument may seem too facile. Even if consumer expectations are
met, there appears to be another type of deception going on here. After
all, consumers could make a better-informed purchasing decision if they
were aware that the product actually comes from plaintiff, at least in
those cases where plaintiff has a reputation for goods of this nature.
Although defendant may not actually be lying, it has ce:rtainly withheld
useful information from consumers.
But such nondisclosure does not of itself justify a cause of action.
Even a cursory review of trademark law shows that the law does not, as a
general rule, require full disclosure of source information. 9 ' For
example, a seller who uses the same mark on many different goods is
under no obligation to ensure that the goods are of consistent quality. In
fact, the very adoption of a trademark involves a form of non-disclosure,
as the seller is now hiding behind the mask of a name other than its own.
The widespread practice of "private branding" presents the most
obvious analog to reverse passing off. Many retailers, particularly
supermarkets and drug chains, buy products from a manufacturer, attach
their own mark, and sell the products to the public.' No one claims that
this practice is deceptive. Yet, private branding deceives customers every
bit as much as reverse passing off; for in both cases the seller has failed
to disclose the real origin of the product.2"
All things considered, it is impossible to justify Reverse Passing Off
as a means of controlling deception. Realizing exactly how knowledge of
the source is important to consumers makes it apparent that most reverse
passing off is not deceptive. What little deception occurs is
indistinguishable from other common marketing practices.
198. There are a number of laws requiring disclosure of source information. However, these rules
are not part of general trademark statutes. Most of these laws are special rules promulgated by
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration.
199. For statistics on the incidence of private branding, see Arthur M. Handler & Eileen P.
McCarthy, Conopco-Consumer Confusion Remains the Touchstone of Trad? Dress Infingement,
86 Trademark Rep. 595, 595-96 (1996).
200. Accord Rittenberg, supra note 19, at 1758 n.13; Sergent, supra note 19, at 71. The author
could find no cases in which private branding was challenged as deceptive. Of course, one would not
expect to find any cases in which the true source challenged the practice. In a case of private
branding, the true source cannot bring suit because it has consented to the defendant's use of its own
mark. However, a suit by the true source is not the only way in which a court could determine
whether reverse passing off was deceptive. Consumers could in theory sue the defendant for
misrepresentation. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission could police the practice under its
power to regulate "deceptive" trade practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). However, a search of the
case law reveals no cases in which either consumers or the Commission has challenged private
branding. The lack of case law suggests that we as a society do not consider private branding
misleading even though the seller has failed to disclose the "true" source of the product it is selling.
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2. Preserving Goodwill Generated by the Source
Sellers do not use trademarks out of some altruistic desire to provide
consumers with free information about the source of products. Instead,
they use trademarks to maximize profits. Consumers who have positive
experiences with products bearing a certain brand name are more likely
to buy that brand in the future. This goodwill gives the seller a clear edge
in the market. Because a trademark provides consumers with a ready way
to distinguish the desired goods from others, sellers use marks to reap the
goodwill generated by their prior sales.
One argument commonly used to support a cause of action for reverse
passing off is that the practice inhibits the development of goodwill.20' If
defendant takes credit for plaintiffs work, plaintiff cannot take
advantage of the goodwill it has developed. There is a sense of
unfairness here, the same sort of injustice that underlies the tort of
general misappropriation.
However, any analogy to misappropriation is misplaced. Unlike a
typical case of misappropriation, defendant is not reaping the fruits of
another's labors. Because consumers in a case of reverse passing off do
not associate the product with plaintiff, their immediate purchasing
decisions will not be swayed by any favorable prior experiences with the
product. In fact, there is no obvious immediate benefit to defendant in
removing plaintiffs name from the product.
The argument that reverse passing off is unfair, then, must stem from
the idea that plaintiff has a right to reap the future goodwill attributable
to the products it has created.0 2 However, this argument proves too
much. Defendant, after all, is engaged in competition with the plaintiff.
Competition is a battle for future goodwill. Although the law places
limits on competitive behavior, defendant has not exceeded these limits
by engaging in this type of practice. Unlike typical instances of unfair
competition, defendant has not lied to or coerced customers, nor has it
engaged in egregious behavior towards plaintiff, its competitor.
201. Freedman, supra note 19, at 321-22; Rittenberg, supra note 19, at 1763; Sergent, supra note
19, at 66.
202. One leading commentator labels reverse passing off "anticompetitive commercial robbery."
Borchard, supra note 17, at 24. His choice of the word "robbery" is telling. Robbery exists only
where the victim has some sort of exclusive right in the item taken. Borchard, like others, merely
assumes that the source of a product does have a legal right to the future development of goodwill,
and devotes his efforts to defining how that right should operate in practice. This approach simply
begs the question.
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Defendant has merely failed to provide one item of information that
customers might find useful.
In the copying cases, defendant has competed by copying plaintiff's
product. Unless the product is protected by the patent and copyright
laws, the Supreme Court has consistently held that copying benefits,
rather than disrupts, competition. 3 If a defendant who copies must
disclose that copying to the public, many of the economic efficiencies
that arise from copying will be lost.
In the resale cases, on the other hand, plaintiff has already received all
of the goodwill that it can legitimately expect. Plaintiff had a chance to
profit when it sold the product at the outset. That original sale added a
little to plaintiff's goodwill, assuming that the buyer enjoyed the product.
But plaintiff should not also be entitled to goodwill on later sales of that
same product. Just as one is free to remove the marks of all products that
one sells at a garage sale, defendant should be free to remove plaintiff's
mark or even to substitute its own when it resells the good in the future.
That plaintiff and defendant are in competition is irrelevant. Because
plaintiff cannot control resale by consumers, it has no justified
expectation of receiving credit for its good in the future. For the law to
provide a right to credit whenever a competitor happens to resell the
product would be nothing more than a windfall to plaintiff.2"
203. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157-58 (1989).
204. Sergent, supra note 19, at 47-48. The very fact that the defendant in a resale case can
compete successfully with the plaintiff suggests that something has gone awry in the market. After
all, defendant must buy the good from plaintiff. In order to make a profit, detLndant must charge its
customers at least as much as it paid. Moreover, because defendant is reselling the product under its
own name, it does not have the advantage of any goodwill that consumers have towards the plaintiff.
There are a number of reasons why defendant might be able to compete under these conditions.
The most obvious example is where defendant has goodwill in its own name or mark. If defendant
has competed in the market for this product or closely related products, consumers may rely on their
past experiences with that name or mark to gauge the quality of the goods that defendant is selling.
Even if the price is greater, consumers in such a case may favor defendanfs goods because they
assume the quality is greater. However, few of the reverse passing off cases involve defendants with
an established reputation.
A second reason why consumers may buy from defendant is that defendant somehow undersells
plaintiff. For example, defendant may have negotiated a quantity discount with the plaintiff. If
plaintiffs quantity discount accurately reflects its economies of scale, of course, defendant should
not have any cost advantage when it resells to individual buyers. However, there are many
circumstances in which defendant will be able to undersell plaintiff. Plaintiff may have inflated its
price in individual sales to cover its quantity discounts. Or plaintiff may provide not only the
product, but also related set-up or warranty services not provided by defendant.
Finally, defendant's advantage may derive from the simple fact that it is not the plaintiff. If
consumers have had trouble with plaintiffs goods in the past, they may avoid those goods in the
market. They could conceivably prefer to buy from an unknown source-ev,.n at a higher price-
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Therefore, none of the proffered justifications for Reverse Passing Off
are valid. Imposing liability does nothing to prevent or cure any
meaningful consumer deception. Allowing plaintiff to reap the future
goodwill that would flow to it from connection with the product would
threaten the delicate balance established by the copyright and patent laws
between the need to encourage innovation and the general freedom to
compete. Reverse Passing Off gives the original source an unfair
advantage over its competitors without providing any corresponding
benefit to the market.
B. The Special Case ofArtists
Even the matter offact attitude of the law does not require us to
consider the sale of the rights to a literary work in the same way
that we would consider the sale of a barrel ofpork."5
The law often treats artists differently from those who produce other
commodities.2" For example, most nations operate two separate systems,
copyright for artists and patent for other innovators. Legislatures have
created special rules for artists because of a widespread perception that
art is somehow different. These same differences may affect the question
of reverse passing off. Even if Reverse Passing Off is not generally
available, there may be special considerations that support a limited
cause of action for artists.07
The most obvious distinction between artists and others is that the
United States is obligated by treaty to protect an artist's association with
the works he produces. After almost a century of deliberation, the United
States in 1989 finally joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of
than from the plaintiff. In this case, plaintiff's name or mark has acquired a "negative" goodwill,
resulting in a commercial disadvantage.
205. Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910) (Seabury, J.,
concurring).
206. This Article uses "artist" in a non-technical way. The term is intended to include authors,
composers, sculptors, choreographers, and all similar creators. Defining who is an "artist" is
notoriously difficult, and has occupied the attention of many scholars and judges. Fortunately, it is
not necessary to define the concept precisely in order to understand the thesis of this Article. For
those interested in a rough working definition, an "artist" is a person who produces creative works
that appeal mainly to our aesthetic values, while a "non-artist" produces works that serve a particular
function other than aesthetics.
207. See Freedman, supra note 19, at 322-23 (recognizing that reverse passing off cases
involving artists present special considerations).
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Literary and Artistic Works.20 ' This treaty requires signatories to provide
a host of legal rights to artists. Among these rights is the article 6bis right
to "claim authorship."2 9  Although perhaps susceptible to other
interpretations,2 0 article 6bis has been interpreted by the United States as
requiring that the artist be given a right to seek legal recourse against
third parties who either remove the artist's name from a work of art or
substitute their own name.21 ' This is, of course, closely akin to Reverse
Passing Off. Therefore, in order to satisfy its Berne obligations, United
States law must afford some sort of Reverse Passing Off right to all
artists within the contemplation of the treaty.
During the debates leading to United States accession to Berne,
several members of Congress argued that the treaty would not have that
great an impact because United States law already afforded many of the
required rights.212 These proponents asserted that the right to claim
authorship was covered by Reverse Passing Off under the Lanham Act.213
Notwithstanding these arguments, Congress included a limited right to
claim authorship in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, codified in
section 106A of the Copyright Act.214
208. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116,205, 301,401-411,501, 504, 801 (19;88)).
209. Article 6bis provides in relevant part:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Beme Convention, supra note 14, art. 6bis, at 235.
210. Article 6bis does not explicitly state that the author may bring a cause of action. It is possible
to provide a right of paternity by means short of a private right to recovery. Fcr example, the "right"
could be achieved simply by allowing the author to proclaim his authorship to the world without fear
of retribution from either the government or the party holding the copyright
211. In theory, the article 6bis right of integrity might also be used to the same end. In addition to
the right to claim authorship, 6bis(1) gives an author the right, "to object to any ... mutilation or
other modification of... the work.., which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation." Beme
Convention, supra note 14, art. 6bis, at 235 (emphasis added). The concept ofreputation can easily
encompass goodwill. The more difficult question is whether removal of the author's name or mark is
a "mutilation" of the work. Even when the author places his name on the surface of a painting, that
name is not necessarily an integral part of the work. If the name or mark can be removed without
affecting the expression, removal does not constitute a mutilation of the underlying work of art.
212. For a summary of the views, see H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 32-40 (1988).
213. Id.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
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Section 106A, however, does not satisfy the requirements of article
6bis. Berne's definition of "literary and artistic works" includes many
works that would not qualify as a section 106A works of visual art.2"5 For
example, section 106A does not include any works of literature or
musical compositions. And because the Lanham Act does not reach
reverse passing off for the reasons discussed above,2 16 there is no national
legislation providing a right of attribution to all artists covered by Berne.
Congress must accordingly act if the United States is to comply with
Berne.2
17
On the other hand, Congress might choose not to provide a general
right to claim authorship, even if it elects otherwise to comply with
Berne. It would certainly not be the first time that the United States failed
to satisfy a technical treaty obligation. The Berne Convention, like other
treaties, contains an entire palette of rights. Many of these rights comport
with United States policy. However, it is not entirely clear that article
6bis strikes the proper balance on the question of attribution. After all,
Part IV.A of this Article demonstrated that there are sound policy reasons
against providing a general action of Reverse Passing Off. In order to
justify the special cause of action for artists envisioned by Berne, it must
be shown that these producers are somehow different from non-artists.
Moreover, not all differences count. Reverse Passing Off is justified only
if there are demonstrable differences between artists and others regarding
the two possible justifications for a cause of action: consumer deception
and protecting future goodwill.
215. The Berne Convention covers "literary and artistic works," which article 2(l) defines as:
every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or
form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses,
sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works;
choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without
words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous
to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and
lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process
analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-
dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.
Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1), at 222. This definition is quite broad. Some of the listed
works, such as maps and three-dimensional geographic representations, might not qualify as works
of art even under this Article's expansive definition, set forth supra note 206.
216. See discussion supra Part I.B.
217. State statutes or common law may, and often do, supply a cause of action. However, article
6bis(3) explicitly provides that the 6bis rights are to be made effective by national legislation. Berne




As discussed above, most reverse passing off does not mislead
consumers because defendant's misrepresentation that it is the source of
the product causes no harm to consumers. Most consumers do not care
about "source" as an absolute. They are interested in source only because
it provides some indication of the quality of the product being
considered. As long as defendant is selling products of consistent quality,
consumers are not deceived by defendant's mark on plaintiff's product.
From this perspective, art is no different. A person considering the
purchase of a painting, recording, or book is certainly interested in
knowing the name of the artist, performer, or author. Like the case of
non-art, however, that interest exists mainly because knowing the artist's
name provides some indication of the quality of the work."'
In fact, knowing the name of the artist may actually be less important
when shopping for art. Using the name of the source is an imprecise way
to judge quality.2" 9 Other methods, especially physical inspection, are
much more accurate. Notwithstanding the chance for error, shoppers rely
on source information primarily because the other methods of
ascertaining quality often prove to be impracticable or too expensive.
However, many works of art lend themselves quite readily to these other
means of gauging quality. Visual inspection is much more useful when
judging the quality of a painting than it is when evaluating an
automobile. The quality of a painting is determined almost exclusively
by its appeal to the eye, and does not include difficult-to-test factors that
would be relevant in the case of the automobile, such as durability.
Similarly, although a book or recording cannot be judged by visual
inspection, there are other means, such as book and record reviews, to
determine quality. In many respects, then, misrepresentations about the
source of a work of art would as a general matter seem to be less
218. Some consumers may know artists personally, and accordingly want to buy from them for
reasons other than objective quality. However, this phenomenon also exists in the case of non-artistic
products. Any differences between artists and non-artists in this regard is one of degree, not kind.
219. Use of a mark is most accurate when the consumer has either had prior experience with
goods from the same source, or has received information from others with experience. Nevertheless,
the mark is still a fairly imprecise measure of quality. In essence, the consumer is relying on an
assumption the goods will be of roughly the same quality as before.
Marks are even less precise when the consumer has never dealt with the seller before, or if the
consumer has had past dealings but cannot recall them. In this case, the consumer has no solid
information about the source or the actual level of quality. At best, the consumer will be forced to
rely on seller advertising. Moreover, the consumer may assume that branded goods are generally
"better." Neither of these sources of information, of course, is necessarily very accurate.
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deceptive than misrepresentations concerning the source of other
products.22
On the other hand, perhaps complete accuracy of source information
is more important in the sale of art for other reasons. Art is, after all,
something more than a simple functional product. It is a form of
communication. The plaintiff who creates a work of art is conveying an
idea to others through that work. In all forms of communication,
knowing the identity of the speaker may help listeners evaluate the worth
of the message. Reverse passing off obscures the identity of the artist and
accordingly may distort the message.
Even this argument, however, does not support Reverse Passing Off.
First, the argument assumes that the name of the artist would actually
mean something to the observer. If the observer has never before
encountered a work by the artist, knowing the artist's name adds nothing
to the message conveyed by that work. Second, even if the name would
mean something, there is no general principle in the law that requires an
artist, or any speaker, to disclose his name. Many works of art are
distributed anonymously. Others are published under pseudonyms.22' In
fact, if the law is truly concerned with this sort of deception, copyright
law's "work for hire" doctrine, which vests copyright not in the actual
author but in the person who employs the artist to produce a work, seems
somewhat of an anomaly.' Given that all of these other situations also
convey false information, it is difficult to justify singling out reverse
220. There are admittedly cases in which misrepresentations as to the source of a work of art may
be more deceptive. First, as discussed supra note 218, some consumers may be interested in
purchasing the works of a particular artist not because of any reputation of quality, but because they
know the artist personally.
Second, many works of art are purchased for resale. In this situation, knowing the name of the
artist may be a better way of judging the market value of the work than inspection. Artistic taste is
highly idiosyncratic. The mere fact that a purchaser adores a sculpture is not necessarily an
indication that that sculpture will appeal to others. Buying works of an artist with an established
reputation provides a hedge against this unpredictability because that reputation is good evidence
that the artist's works have appealed to a certain audience in the past. Ensuring that a work of art is
identified with the actual artist may accordingly protect those consumers who purchase for resale.
However, this consideration does not support a general cause of action for all artists, although it may
support the more limited right set out in § 106A of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). In
this vein, it is interesting to note that § 106A covers only "works of visual art" produced in limited
editions, the types most often purchased for resale.
221. Disclosure is not even a condition of copyright protection, as the Copyright Act allows for
the registration ofanonymous and pseudonymous works. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
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passing off.223 For all of these reasons, then, deception cannot support
even a narrow version of Reverse Passing Off limited to artists.
2. Capturing Goodwill
Reverse Passing Off gives the plaintiff more of the goodwill generated
by products it designs or produces. Although this does provide an
additional incentive for future creative activity, that incentive is
ordinarily not enough to justify a cause of action.' The law already has
means to assure that the innovator can profit from its creations. Unless
there is reason to believe that these other incentives are insufficient for
artists, there is no reason to allow artists to recover for reverse passing
off.
In many cases, artists are motivated by different factors than other
producers. It is often said, for example, that the artist does not produce
for profit, but instead because of a personal need to express an idea or
notion in a work. Regardless of whether the perception is accurate,' it
alone does not warrant a cause of action. Reverse Passing Off is meant to
increase the plaintiff's goodwill by ensuring that it receives credit for
what it has produced. This in turn increases future sales. If the artist is
less interested in profit than the non-artist, this financial windfall will
actually be less of a motivating factor for future work than it would be
for a non-artist.
On the other hand, there is another, more subtle, way in which
goodwill may motivate the artist. Consider how gcodwill actually
develops. A seller acquires goodwill when consumers have positive
experiences with the products it produces. As consumers associate those
positive experiences with the seller itself, the seller acquires a certain sort
of "fame."
Most sellers do not care about this fame in and of itself. Fame is
important only because consumers have memories. Consumers carry
their recollections of positive experiences with them inlo the market in
223. The actual source could not sue in any of these situations because it has consented to
defendant's use of its own name. However, a suit by the source is not th. only way to police
deception. Consumers who feel deceived might bring an action for misrepresentation or an action
under a state consumer protection law. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission could intervene in
such a case, as it did in United States v. American Greetings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio
1958), aJfd, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
225. Western society clings to the myth of the starving but driven artist. Actually, many artists
produce art for profit, and some do very well.
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the future and accordingly will be more willing to purchase the seller's
products. Fame, then, is important to the non-artist because it results in
increased sales. The promise of these sales, not the notoriety itself,
motivates the seller both to innovate and to take credit for the innovation.
For most sellers, the law can protect this potential for future profit
without providing a cause of action for reverse passing off. Trademark
law, by protecting the symbols that consumers use to associate their past
experiences with a particular seller's goods, allows the seller to reap the
results of that future goodwill. Although Reverse Passing Off might
make the seller even better off, it does so at the expense of fair
competition.
It is in this respect that artists are different. For whatever reason-
perhaps simple vanity-those who produce a work of art or literature
want recognition for their creations. More importantly, many artists are
unique in that they want recognition for recognition's sake, not merely
because it may result in increased demand for future works. The painter,
composer, sculptor, and even the academic writing a book or article has
poured a great deal of himself into his work; he naturally feels slighted if
someone else receives credit for that work. For the artist, then, fame itself
provides part, or maybe even all, of the motivation for creative
activity.
221
Of course, the fact that artists want this recognition begs the question.
A legal right to recognition may well result in more artistic production,
perhaps more than society wants. However, it is safe to conclude that
most societies have already made the decision that they want to increase
artistic production. Most already have laws in force, such as patent and
copyright, to encourage innovation. Moreover, when compared to the
monopoly provided by the patent laws and the quasi-monopoly created
by copyright, Reverse Passing Off is a relatively cost-free way to
motivate artists. Competition is not restricted, because the cause of action
does not forbid the competitor from reselling or copying the work. The
seller merely must tell the purchaser who the real source of the product
is.
Although the artist's unique desire for recognition may justify a cause
of action limited to artists, not all types of reverse passing off should be
actionable. An author wants credit for those works she actually creates.
Accordingly, the cause of action should clearly cover the resale cases, in
226. In the case of academic works, for example, the author generally receives no direct
compensation. Admittedly, there are certainly many non-artists who also take pride in their work.
However, it is the rare non-artist for whom this pride is the primary motivation for creative activity.
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which the credit for the original work is the issue. However, there is no
need to extend the cause of action to copying cases. As long as the
defendant is free to copy the good-an issue governed by the copyright
laws-it should be free to claim credit for its copies. The author should
only receive credit for the works produced by the author, not by other
parties. 7
In conclusion, then, the special characteristics of the artist justify
granting a limited cause of action for reverse passing off to artists, but
not to others. Unless artists know that they will be associated with their
work, they may not be willing to invest the time and energy needed to
produce a work of quality. The law should accordingly allow the original
artists to prevent others from taking credit for works that the artists
actually produced. The next section explores the form that such a cause
of action might take.
C. A Proposal
Part II of this Article explored the various possible sources of Reverse
Passing Off. Although the Lanham Act, as currently written, does not
support a cause of action, courts could find such a right in existing state
law. In addition, section 106A of the Copyright Act provides a more
limited cause of action in favor of visual artists."
However, this existing hodgepodge of laws lacks uniformity. When
the United States acceded to the Berne Convention, it agreed to protect
indications of source in works of art. article 6bis expressly indicates that
such protection should be set forth in national legislation. 9 Therefore,
the preferable way to provide for Reverse Passing Off is -through a single
federal statute.
The simplest way to provide a uniform cause of action would be to
build upon some current law. Copyright Act section 106A is the obvious
choice. That section's "right to claim authorship" includes the right to
227. Supra note 18 discusses the sample and photograph cases, which are in some sense a hybrid
between the resale and copying cases. Reverse passing off cases in which an artist's work is used as
a sample are likely to be exceedingly rare. But cf, Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dolls); Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(toy horse). Should such a case arise, it should be treated like a resale case, and the artist should be
allowed to recover. Like the resale cases, the issue is whether the artist receives credit for his actual
handiwork. It is irrelevant whether the author receives that credit in connecticn with the sale of the
original, or the use of the original to sell copies.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
229. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 6bis, at 235.
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challenge reverse passing off. Moreover, as discussed above, section
106A is limited to resale cases,"0 the only type of reverse passing off
case in which protection of artists can be justified."1 Congress would
need to amend section 106A in order to ensure that all artists receive
proper recognition for the original works. It should clarify the vague
phrase "right to claim authorship" by specifying that it includes the right
to bring a private action against a defendant who engages in reverse
passing off. Most importantly, Congress should extend the protection of
section 106A to all works within the subject-matter of copyright, not
merely works of visual art.?2
Remedies are another issue. A practical, but largely unrecognized,
problem with allowing a private action for reverse passing off is
choosing a proper remedy for the plaintiff. 3 Because most courts have
concluded that reverse passing off is actionable under section
230. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
231. Limiting the protection to resale cases may benefit sculptors and painters, but will be of
significantly less benefit to authors, recording artists, and others whose works are sold in numerous
copies. The defendant who wants to reverse pass off a book or recording will not simply resell the
original. Rather, it will copy plaintiff's work and sell it under defendant's own name. The § 106A
right to claim authorship provides no relief in these copying cases.
That limitation is not a problem because the author or recording artist already has ample rights. All
artists who produce original works are protected by the other provisions of the copyright laws and
can therefore sue the copier for infringement. In fact, the right to sue for infringement is even more
powerful than § 106A insofar as it allows the plaintiff to stop altogether defendant's sale of its
copies. A defendant who cannot sell cannot engage in reverse passing off.
In some cases the artist will assign the copyright to a printer or producer. Although the artists have
lost the right to sue for infringement they can still obtain protection by negotiating a right of
attribution in their contracts of assignment.
232. Congress may also need to refine the Copyright Act's concept of "author" in order to make
the new right effective. For example, the plaintiff in the leading case of Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d
602 (9th Cir. 1981), had no rights under the copyright laws. Although the work in question-a
film-did fall within the subject-matter of copyright, the Copyright Act would consider the producer
or director the "author." Although this rule may make sense in the context of copyright's exclusive
rights, it is too restrictive in the case of the right to claim authorship. Claimants who have
contributed to works covered by copyright should have a right to have their contributions
acknowledged.
In one respect, however, Congress needs to limit § 106A. As written, the section allows authors to
claim authorship of works with respect to later sales even if they have not claimed authorship for the
initial sales. If the purpose of Reverse Passing Off is to ensure the author the opportunity to receive
the notoriety necessary to inspire creation, it is inappropriate to extend the cause of action to an
author who conveys a work without any attempt to claim credit.
233. A few courts have struggled with the question of damages. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v.
Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1243-45 (8th Cir. 1994); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.
Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1976); Santrayll v. Burrell, No. 91 Civ.
3166, 1996 WL 134803, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1996). An outstanding scholarly discussion of the
issue is contained in Sergent, supra note 19, at 65-68.
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43(a) of the Lanham Act, they have also borrowed the remedies from
that statute. The Lanham Act authorizes a wide array of remedies,
including profits,2 4 damages, 5 destruction of infringing items, 6 and
injunctions. 2 7 In some cases, a victorious plaintiff is also entitled to
treble damages and attorney's fees. 8 These Lanham Act remedies are
quite similar to those authorized by the Copyright Act, although the
Copyright Act provides for statutory damages in lieu of treble
damages. 3 Most of the Copyright Act remedies are available in section
106A cases.240 Therefore, if Congress provides a cause of action for
reverse passing off to artists under section 106A, there is likely to be
very little change in the way in which courts handle damages.
The question of remedies wanants closer scrutiny. Although the
remedies provided by the Lanham and Copyright Acts make perfect
sense in an ordinary infringement case, they present serious difficulties
in a case of reverse passing off. Unlike ordinary copyright or trademark
infringement or false advertising, defendant's acts do not deprive
plaintiff of any immediate sales which it could otherwise expect to make.
In fact, if defendant had correctly named plaintiff as the source, it is
entirely likely that defendant would have diverted more sales from
plaintiff than it did by selling the product under its own name.
24
'
234. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994). See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210
(8th Cir. 1976) (without considering implications, awarding plaintiff all ofdefendant's profits).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1994).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1117. Augmented damages are a matter of discretion in most cases, including all
cases under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. However, § 35(b) mandates the imposition of treble damages
when defendant intentionally uses a counterfeit of a registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
239. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994). The Copyright Act, like the Lanham Act, also allows for the
recovery of actual damages and profits, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), injunctions, 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994),
seizure and destruction of any infringing items, 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1994), and attorneys' fees,
17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
240. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
241. Consider what actually occurs in a reverse passing off case. Consumers purchase a product
from defendant under the belief, admittedly erroneous, that it originates from defendant. If plaintiff
does not compete in the market for that product, plaintiff clearly has lost no sales. More importantly,
even if plaintiff does compete, some consumers have chosen defendant's goods over plaintiffs. As
discussed supra note 204, the most likely reason is a price differential. However, if defendant is
selling its product at a price lower than plaintiff, requiring defendant to acknowledge plaintiff may
well increase defendant's sales, for defendant would then have the additional advantage of any
goodwill associated with plaintiff.
Conversely, consumers may be avoiding plaintiff because it has developed a poor reputation. In
this case, requiring defendant to acknowledge plaintiff may increase plaintiff's sales, although it is
more likely to benefit the other competitors in the industry.
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Therefore, giving plaintiff a right to recover the profits from defendant's
sale is not an appropriate measure of plaintiffs loss. Plaintiff can gain
the sales going to defendant only by barring defendant from the market
altogether, regardless of what mark it uses. That, however, results in the
sort of monopoly that falls within the exclusive province of the copyright
and patent laws, not Reverse Passing Off.
In addition, the fact that the proposed cause of action applies only in
resale cases makes an award of profits particularly inappropriate. A
plaintiff in a resale case has already sold the original and received
whatever profit it could command at that time. Defendant's reverse
passing off does not affect this sale, but only the profits that plaintiff
might earn on future sales of other works. Awarding plaintiff the profits
that defendant has earned on the resale bears no reasonable relation to the
harm actually suffered.
Damages are another option. But even an award of damages is
inappropriate in a reverse passing off case. As noted just above,
plaintiff's harm is the loss of future goodwill. These damages are highly
speculative and difficult to estimate.242 More importantly, however, an
award of damages for loss of future goodwill does not comport with the
reasons for creating a cause of action for artists but not for others. Artists
should be allowed to recover for reverse passing off only because that is
the only way to ensure that they receive the recognition necessary to
motivate them to create. The recognition is meant to relate solely to the
instant work, not to heighten the demand for the artist's other products.
Giving artists a right to recover future goodwill as damages results in the
same sort of unjustified windfall criticized earlier in this Article.243
Nor does seizure and destruction of defendant's goods address the real
harm in these cases. Like an award of profits, seizure and destruction
results in a form of overkill. It is warranted in ordinary infringement
cases because it is the only sure way of preventing the defendant from
An order requiring defendant to acknowledge plaintiff will help plaintiff's sales only in the
relatively rare case where defendant's advantage stems from its own reputation.
242. Damages are much easier to estimate in a regular trademark case because the issue is loss of
current sales. In a reverse passing off case, by contrast, the court must prophesy how plaintiff's
goodwill would have developed, and then translate that higher level of goodwill into a loss of future
sales. Because of the number of factors that can affect future goodwill, this process is little better
than pure speculation.
243. For the same reasons, treble damages are not warranted in reverse passing off cases. Except
in the case of counterfeiting, the Lanham Act specifically provides that treble damages are not to be
used as a penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Instead, they are intended to cover the components of
damages that are likely to exist, but are difficult to measure.
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making a sale that would otherwise have been made by the plaintiff.
Because defendants in reverse passing off cases are not stealing sales
from the plaintiff, seizure and destruction goes too far.
In fact, the ideal remedy in cases of reverse passing off cases is quite
simple. All of the policy considerations can be satisfied merely by
requiring the defendant to notify consumers of the actual source of the
product or sample. This ensures that plaintiff receives credit for the work
it has done, and interferes only to a minimal extent with defendant's
ability to compete in the market for the product. Such an order would be
fully effective even if it occurred after the sale.2'
The final option is statutory damages under Copyright Act section
504(c). Statutory damages are intended to ensure that the copyright
owner is compensated even in cases where actual damages and profits
are difficult to measure or prove.24 Arguably, then, such damages should
be available in reverse passing off cases, because of the difficulty of
measuring the value of notoriety.2' However, statutory damages are less
desirable than a simple order of acknowledgment, which provides a
perfect solution. Although it reverses the normal order of things by
making the equitable remedy the remedy of choice, Congress should
amend the remedy provisions to make the order of acknowledgment the
primary remedy in cases of reverse passing off.
There remains, of course, the problem of incentive. Even if
injunctions requiring acknowledgment were granted as a matter of
course, it will still prove to be quite costly for artists to enforce their
rights. The availability of costs and attorneys' fees go a long way
towards ameliorating this problem, and both should continue to be
available in reverse passing off cases.247 Even then, however, there may
not be a sufficient incentive for artists to demand acknowledgment. One
crucial factor is whether the artist will make future sales. If the artist will
make other sales, then the cost of obtaining the order may be offset in
244. An order requiring acknowledgment would also easily fit within the Copyright Act, which
authorizes an injunction in cases involving a § 106A violation. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), 502.
245. A plaintiff must choose between statutory damages and actual damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
(1994). Given the difficulty of proving actual damages in a reverse passing off case, most artists
would opt for statutory damages.
246. The amount of statutory damages authorized by § 504, however, may prove to be excessive
in a case of reverse passing off. Statutory damages are intended as a rough estimate of the sales that
the author lost as a result of defendant's actions. In an ordinary infringement case, it is not illogical
to assume that all sales made by defendant would have otherwise been made by plaintiff. As
demonstrated at supra note 241 and accompanying text, however, one cannot assume that a
defendant in a reverse passing off case deprived plaintiff of any sales.
247. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
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whole or in part by the increase in value of his works.24 However, an
artist who plans no more sales will not have this financial offset. The
desire to be named as author may be a matter of intense personal pride
that the author values quite highly, but it does not generate the income
needed to fund litigation.249
A more far-reaching option to deal with the problem of incentive
would be some sort of administrative remedy."0 For example, the law
could be revised to allow an artist to lodge some sort of complaint with
an agency, perhaps the Copyright Office. The agency could investigate
the matter and order attribution if it determined that the complaint was
well grounded. An administrative scheme of this sort would ensure that
the plaintiff would receive no financial windfall other than the
unavoidable increase in reputation. Moreover, although it would
certainly place an additional burden on the agency, reverse passing off
cases would not prove to be that factually complex. Recall that the
proposed cause of action applies only to cases in which defendant uses
an original actually produced by the plaintiff. Therefore, the agency
could avoid the complex problem of ascertaining the "true source" that
arises in the copying cases."5 The issue of source is ordinarily
straightforward in resale cases, except possibly in the situation where the
defendant modifies the work prior to resale. The other main issue in the
dispute-whether the defendant acknowledged the plaintiff-will also be
relatively simple.
In short, there are many options for the proposed action for reverse
passing off. Of course, legislative action will eventually be required. The
best option would be for Congress to amend section 106A and the
remedies provisions of the Copyright Act to incorporate the above
suggestions. Failing Congressional action, state legislatures would also
be free to enact their own laws, except for artists who are already
protected by current section 106A. Regardless of whether it is enacted by
248. Admittedly, this is the same sort of windfall criticized supra at text accompanying notes
201-04. However, if ensuring that artists receive credit for their works is necessary to provide a
proper incentive, there is no way to avoid the collateral increase in profits that will result.
249. One solution would be to require attorney's fees and costs in these cases. Of course, that
approach only benefits the artist who prevails in litigation.
250. Others have recognized that private civil litigation may not be the best way to deal with
reverse passing off. See Nike, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 509 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(suggesting that Federal Trade Commission action might be appropriate). But cf United States v.
American Greetings Corp., 168 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1958), aftd, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959).
American Greetings is the only reverse passing off case in which the Commission has intervened.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
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the federal or a state government, a well-drafted statute would be far
superior to the attempts courts have made to fit reverse passing off into
the existing law.
V. CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for a serious review of the law dealing with reverse
passing off. Over the past twenty years, courts have generally come to
accept the existence of a cause of action. This trend seems to have
developed a momentum of its own. Most courts seem persuaded by the
numbers, with few engaging in any serious consideration of either the
source of the cause of action or its possible policy ramifications.
At the very least, courts and commentators need to reevaluate the legal
source of the cause of action. They are clearly mistaken in grounding the
action in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; for that statute, when parsed
carefully, simply does not reach reverse passing off. If the cause of
action does exist, it must arise under the state law of unfair competition.
But is reverse passing off really "unfair" within the meaning of these
state laws? It certainly looks unfair, because the defendant is admittedly
lying about the source of the product that it is selling. However, not all
lies are actionable under the law of unfair competition. Rather, the law
gives a competitor the right to challenge lies in the marketplace only
when those lies injure consumers. Analyzed in this light, it becomes clear
that reverse passing off, unlike other statements about source, really
causes no direct harm to consumers. Nor can the cause of action be
justified under a theory of allowing the true source of a product the "just
rewards" of its work. Because neither of the proffered justifications for
the cause of action survives closer scrutiny, courts have erred in
accepting a general action for reverse passing off.
The only case in which reverse passing off can be justified is when a
work of art, literature, or music is involved. Because of the United
States' obligations under the Berne Convention, and the unique factors
that motivate to the artist as "producer," the law needs to ensure that
artists have the right to be associated with their works. Therefore, a
limited form of reverse passing off, one that applies only when a work of
art is resold without acknowledging the artist, can be justified. Although
such a cause of action does not yet exist under federal law, it could be
added without great difficulty to the existing law of copyright.
In a perfect world reverse passing off would not be a. problem. Were
all sellers completely forthright with the consuming public, they would
disclose the source of the goods they sell. For whatever reason, however,
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many take credit for work that is not theirs. Even though this sort of lie is
not admirable, it is not necessarily a situation in which the law should
intervene. Legislatures and courts should police the marketplace only
when it can be shown that intervention will benefit consumers, either by
reducing meaningful deception or by providing an incentive to sellers to
create new products. Except in the case of art, Reverse Passing Off
accomplishes neither of these social goals.

